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INTERNATIONAL SHAREHOLDERS AS 
STEWARDS: TOWARD A NEW CONCEPTION 
OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Iris H-Y Chiu* 
INTRODUCTION 
In the wake of the United Kingdom (U.K.) banking crisis 2008–2009, 
institutional shareholders have been accused of having been “asleep.”1 The 
critique is that institutional shareholders have been uncritical of risky 
business practices in their investee banks and should have monitored board 
risk management.2 Although institutional shareholder apathy is not regarded 
as the key cause of the U.K. banking crisis, the Walker Review, Sir David 
Walker’s report on corporate governance in banks and financial institutions, 
is of the view that such institutional shareholder apathy has provided a 
tolerant context for misjudgments of risk made at the Board level of the 
failed U.K. banks.3 A number of corporate governance reforms have since 
been made in the U.K., including reforms to Board composition and Board-
level practices.4 The focus of this Article is the “Stewardship Code,”5 a set 
of best practices for institutional shareholders, encouraging them to move 
away from apathy and to engage with investee companies. 
The notion of “stewardship,” in relation to institutional shareholders, 
may be “defined as the process through which [institutional] shareholders, 
directors and others seek to influence companies in the direction of long-
term, sustainable performance that derives from contributing to human 
progress and the wellbeing of the environment and society.”6 The key 
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 1. Jennifer Hughes, FSA Chief Lambasts Uncritical Investors, FIN. TIMES, March 11, 2009, 
at 1; Kate Burgess, Myners Lashes Out at Landlord Shareholders, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2009, 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c0217c20-2eaf-11de-b7d3-00144feabdc0.html; see also Helia 
Ebrahimi, Institutional shareholders Admit Oversight Failure on Banks, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, 
Jan. 27, 2009, at 1. 
 2. DAVID WALKER, A REVIEW OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN BANKS AND FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS: FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS ¶¶ 5.10–.11 (Nov. 2009) [hereinafter WALKER 
REVIEW], available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/walker_review_261109.pdf. 
 3. Id. ¶ 5.10.  
 4. See FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, THE UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE 2–3 (June 
2010), available at http://www.frc.org.uk/corporate/ukcgcode.cfm. 
 5. FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, THE UK STEWARDSHIP CODE (July 2010) [hereinafter UK 
STEWARDSHIP CODE], available at http://www.frc.org.uk/corporate/investorgovernance.cfm. 
 6. Arad Reisberg, The Notion of Stewardship from a Company Law Perspective: Re-Defined 
and Re-Assessed in Light of the Recent Financial Crisis?, 18 J. FIN. CRIME 126, 126 (2011) 
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notions in “stewardship” seem to be long-termism, and taking a more 
holistic view of the well-being and performance of the company. This 
Article will argue that “stewardship” embodies an ideological shift in 
corporate governance theory away from the dominant shareholder-centered 
contractarian paradigm. Hence, the role that is expected of shareholder 
stewardship is a form of governance that also serves the interests of 
stakeholders and the public, and not merely a call to rejuvenate shareholder 
power. 
Part I argues that the dominant theoretical framework for corporate 
governance in the U.K. is very much a shareholder-centered contractarian 
paradigm. Although the contractarian theory has been most developed in 
U.S. corporate governance theory, company law in the U.K. and the reforms 
leading up to the Companies Act 2006 (the Companies Act) show that 
policy-makers endorse the dominant contractarian paradigm and the key 
position of shareholders in corporate governance.  
Part II then discusses the U.K. Stewardship Code, a body of soft law for 
the governance role of institutional shareholders. The contextual 
background to the Stewardship Code is also important as “stewardship” is 
articulated as a complementary force for governance in the financial 
regulation landscape post-global-financial-crisis. This Part will argue that 
“stewardship” is a notion that enrolls institutional shareholders into a 
governance role beyond that of corporate governance. This, however, 
entails an ideological paradox. On the one hand, the Stewardship Code 
seems to emphasize the importance of institutional shareholders’ corporate 
governance role, very much in line with the shareholder-centered 
contractarian paradigm dominant in corporate governance theory. This 
Article, however, argues that the principles in the Stewardship Code could 
bring about a gradual move away from shareholder-centered 
contractarianism. This Part will argue that the key features of “stewardship” 
limit shareholders’ contractarian freedom in monitoring, particularly in 
short-termist tendencies. Further, when examined against the backdrop of 
the “enlightened shareholder value” rhetoric supporting the reforms leading 
up to the Companies Act, it will be argued that “stewardship” has the 
potential to introduce an ideological shift that moves away from the tenets 
of shareholder-centered contractarianism. 
Yet, the Stewardship Code is still nested within the broader context of 
the importance of equity finance and securities markets in the U.K. Part III 
suggests that although “stewardship” has the potential to introduce an 
ideological shift in corporate governance theory, such a shift is not in the 
                                                                                                                                          
(citing MARK GOYDER & ARTHUR PROBERT, TOMORROW’S COMPANY, TOMORROW’S 
OWNERS—DEFINING, DIFFERENTIATING AND REWARDING STEWARDSHIP 3 (Pat Cleverly ed., 
2009), available at http://www.forceforgood.com/Uploaded_Content/tool/2311200915392335 
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2012] International Shareholders as Stewards 389 
direction of “communitarianizing” corporate governance theory. This Part 
examines the main strands of “communitarian” theories and argues that the 
“stewardship” notion does not go that far. Nevertheless, this Article 
critically analyzes the principles in the Stewardship Code and argues that 
elements of stakeholder theory may be discerned. This Part argues that 
“stewardship” elevates the importance of “key stakeholders” and 
contextualizes the objective of shareholding so that the nature of 
shareholder-centered contractarianism could be significantly affected. 
It may nevertheless be argued that the form of stakeholder theory that is 
supported by the Stewardship Code is a somewhat weak and confused 
version of stakeholder theory that attempts an uneasy marriage with the 
dominant shareholder-centered contractarian paradigm. Part IV fleshes out 
the theoretical weaknesses of the Stewardship Code. Nonetheless, this 
Article argues that the Stewardship Code represents a first step toward 
modifying the shareholder-centered contractarian nature of the corporation. 
In particular, for financial institutions, the Stewardship Code embodies an 
elevation of the state or relevant regulator into a key stakeholder position.7 
The notion of “key stakeholders” has evolutionary potential in corporate 
governance theory and it is hoped that such ideological possibilities can be 
further developed in corporate governance theory. 
I. SHAREHOLDER-CENTERD CONTRACTARIANISM AS 
DOMINANT IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE THEORY 
Much of the theoretical literature in corporate law may be placed 
broadly in two camps of thought. The first is that the company is a nexus of 
contracts, and hence, the nature of corporate law deals with transactional, 
relational, and private order issues. The second views the corporation as a 
“real entity” whose activities and exercise of power may entail social 
impact and externalities, and so, posits that corporate law should relate to 
the entity nature of the corporation and its acts. As Worthington argues, 
both strands of thought are evident in the development of corporate law in 
the U.K.,8 although the contractarian model supporting the agency paradigm 
that characterizes the Board-shareholder relationship is arguably the 
                                                                                                                                          
 7. This is not an entirely new idea. An earlier piece by Kern Alexander points out that the 
state has an interest in regulating corporate governance aspects of financial institutions where this 
has bearing on the micro-prudential soundness of financial institutions, such as the fitness and 
soundness of senior management. See Kern Alexander, UK Corporate Governance and Banking 
Regulation: The Regulator’s Role as Stakeholder, 33 STETSON L. REV. 991, 1033–34 (2004). This 
Article takes this idea further and argues that while the state’s “stake” after the global financial 
crisis may need to become more open-ended, this may be difficult to accommodate within existing 
corporate governance ideology. The Article will thus evaluate what the Stewardship Code has 
achieved from the ideological point of view. 
 8. Sarah Worthington, Shares and Shareholders: Property, Power and Entitlement, 22 
COMPANY LAW. 258, 307, at 263–66, 308–10 (2001) (pts. 1 & 2). 
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dominant theoretical paradigm for corporate theory and law.9 The 
contractarian model of corporate governance and law, and the finance 
perspective that characterizes the Board-shareholder relationship as one of 
agency, allow institutional shareholders to be placed in the key role of 
monitoring management. Such is the optimal hypothetical bargain that 
shareholders would have made. 
A. THE DOMINANCE OF THE CONTRACTARIAN PARADIGM IN 
CORPORATE THEORY AND LAW 
In 1937, Coase’s seminal work The Nature of the Firm10 provided the 
foundation upon which the contractarian conception of the corporation 
became a dominant intellectual paradigm.11 The firm as a nexus of 
transactions that are off market because of transaction cost efficiency has 
become a powerful and lasting conception of the corporation. 
The contractarian approach focuses on the microscopic constituents of 
the firm as a nexus of contracts entered into by volition; hence, the role of 
corporate law, boosted by the rise of the law and economics movement, 
deals with making such contractual relations efficacious. Staunch 
contractual theorists in corporate law support the role of corporate law as an 
enabling or facilitative framework so that contracting parties may decide 
how their relations may be governed.12 The pure contractual framework is 
oblivious to the effects of the corporate entity as a whole. Bebchuk has 
nevertheless pointed out that it is a myth that constituents in a corporation 
actively engage in contractual bilateralism to determine the substantive 
governance of their relations.13 
                                                                                                                                          
 9. John Armour & Michael Whincop, The Proprietary Foundations of Corporate Law, 32 
O.J.L.S. 429, 429 (2007) (Eng.). See generally BRIAN R. CHEFFINS, COMPANY LAW: THEORY, 
STRUCTURE AND OPERATION (1997) (providing contractarian analyses of the company; pages 31–
46 examines the contractarian theory itself). 
 10. Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). 
 11. Steven M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 
97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 547 (2003). 
 12. See, e.g., William A. Klein, The Modern Business Organization: Bargaining Under 
Constraints, 91 YALE L.J. 1521 (1982) (suggesting that the firm may be understood as a series of 
bargains, negotiated under constraints, and made in view of a long-term relationship); Fred 
McChesney, Contractarianism Without Contracts? Yet Another Critique of Eisenberg, 90 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1332 (1990) (arguing that Eisenberg’s view that a corporation is essentially a nexus of 
rules, rather than contracts, is foolish because such rules are quintessentially contractual rules); 
Manuel A. Utset, Towards a Bargaining Theory of the Firm, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 540 (1995) 
(positing that the manager-shareholder relationship may best be conceptualized as a game-theory 
based bargain).  
 13. See Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The 
Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1820, 1827–29 (1989); 
Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, The Debate on Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1395, 1400–01 (1989). 
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Easterbrook and Fischel’s influential thesis is that the role of corporate 
law is to provide a default set of rules that represents a hypothetical bargain 
between institutional shareholders and management.14 This overcomes the 
problem of the myth of active contracting, but nevertheless upholds the 
enabling character of corporate law to support the conception of the 
corporation as a nexus of contracts. These hypothetical bargains would 
reasonably reflect contracting parties’ expectations as well as minimize 
transaction costs amongst them.15 The “defaultization” thesis goes as far as 
to support shareholder rights such as voting and the imposition of fiduciary 
duties on directors in order to protect the open-ended residual risks that 
institutional shareholders bear.16 
The contractarian model has evolved to focus on the Board-shareholder 
relationship following the financial economics perspective that 
characterizes the main corporate governance “problem” as the agency 
problem. The Board-shareholder relationship is defined as an agency 
relationship, where institutional shareholders bear agency costs as part of 
the risk of delegating to management the primary role of generating and 
using corporate wealth.17 Such delegation is open-ended, and shareholders 
bear the residual risks that management would be serving their own 
interests instead of maximizing shareholder wealth.18 The agency paradigm 
is a dominant ideological paradigm influencing the legal characterization of 
shareholders’ roles and powers and directors’ fiduciary duties. Mandatory 
law in the U.K. treats shareholders as the monitors of the Board, and 
provides for certain decisions to be reserved for the general meeting. 
Provisions dealing with the appointment and removal of directors are 
examples of the former.19 Further, directors or their connected persons are 
not allowed to enter into substantial property transactions with the 
company,20 or to benefit from a company loan or quasi-loan21 or other credit 
                                                                                                                                          
 14. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, in The Economic 
Structure of Corporate Law 1, 34 (1991). 
 15. David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract 
Interpretation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1815, 1819–21 (1991). 
 16. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, The Fiduciary Principle, the 
Business Judgment Rule, and the Derivative Suit, in THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE 
LAW, supra note 14, at 90, 90–91. 
 17. See MICHAEL C. JENSEN & WILLIAM H. MECKLING, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, in FOUNDATIONS OF ORGANIZATIONAL 
STRATEGY 51, 53–54, 95–96 (Michael C. Jensen ed., 1998). 
 18. See id. at 54.  
 19. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, §§ 160, 168–169, 188 (U.K.) (in respect of long-service 
contracts exceeding two years with the company). Appointments may, however, be made just by 
the Board under the Model Articles, although this may be modified by companies. The Companies 
(Model Articles) Regulations, 2008, S.I. 2008/3229, sched. 1, § 17, sched. 2, § 17, sched. 3, § 20 
(U.K.).  
 20. Companies Act §§ 190–196 (U.K.).  
 21. Id. §§ 197–200, 213–214.  
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transaction,22 without the approval of shareholders by an ordinary 
resolution. These provisions co-opt shareholders into monitoring the 
prospects of self-dealing by management, and in turn allow the exercise of a 
form of proprietary control for shareholders. Further, directors acting in 
conflicts of interest and duty may seek shareholder approval for the 
transactions. Shareholder approval thus takes on a gate-keeping function to 
ensure that directors are allowed to proceed without running the risk of a 
breach of fiduciary duties.23 Mandatory law has also provided for 
shareholders to have the right of ratification or otherwise of breaches, 
negligence, or omissions committed by directors.24 The right of shareholder 
ratification seems particularly based on the perspective of shareholders as 
residual risk bearers and hence the exclusive right to act as assessors of 
whether or not it is appropriate to accept irregularities committed by 
management. 
Although the contractarian theory has been most ideologically 
developed in the writings of American commentators, it has perhaps found 
easy acceptance in English corporate law, which has been evolved from 
partnership law. English corporate law arguably has a natural emphasis and 
concern for the private order and internal relationships that subsist beneath 
the corporate structure. Hence, English corporate law is largely dominated 
by the intellectual framework of the contractarian theory which entails two 
consequences for corporate governance: one, that corporate governance is 
essentially a framework for private order; and two, that mandatory 
regulation in this area should be limited unless market failures persist. 
Much of corporate governance in the U.K., in terms of Board 
composition and shareholder engagement, is therefore seen as an exercise 
of best practice in order to motivate institutional shareholders to protect 
their relatively weaker position as principals and residual risk-bearers in the 
open-ended contract into which they have entered. The U.K. Corporate 
Governance Code enshrines a set of best practices for companies to comply 
with or explain, so as to allow institutional shareholders to intelligently 
monitor and consider the effects of corporate governance upon their 
interests.25 This approach is a shareholder-centered contractarian 
perspective of the corporation, viewing institutional shareholders as 
ultimate monitors of Board practices and accountability. The development 
                                                                                                                                          
 22. Id. §§ 201–214.  
 23. Id. §§ 175(4), 180.  
 24. Foss v. Harbottle, (1843) 67 Eng. Rep. 189, 203–04 (Ch.) (now enshrined with 
modification in Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 239). 
 25. Moore further argues that the Stewardship Code should contain macro principles for 
greater flexibility in application so that individual companies can explain their considered 
governance models even if deviating from the Stewardship Code as such. See Marc T. Moore, 
Whispering Sweet Nothings: The Limitations of Informal Conformance in UK Corporate 
Governance, J. CORP. L. STUD. 95, 104 (2009). 
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of corporate governance codes in the U.K. since 199226 is intended to 
facilitate contractarian discipline within the internal working of the 
corporation, even if empirical research by MacNeil and Li, and by Faure-
Grimaud, show that institutional shareholders are largely agnostic about the 
governance profile of an investee company, unless the company has under-
performed.27 The capstone of the first 1992 Cadbury Code of Corporate 
Governance is arguably shareholder monitoring. The Cadbury committee 
views institutional shareholders as follows: 
[Institutional s]hareholders have delegated many of their responsibilities 
as owners to the directors who act as their stewards. It is for the 
[institutional] shareholders to call the directors to book if they appear to be 
failing in their stewardship and they should use this power. While they 
cannot be involved in the direction and management of their company, 
they can insist on a high standard of corporate governance and good 
governance is an essential test of the directors’ stewardship.28  
Institutional shareholders are also especially admonished: 
[T]he way in which institutional shareholders use their power to influence 
the standards of corporate governance is of fundamental importance. Their 
readiness to do this turns on the degree to which they see it as their 
responsibility as owners, and in the interest of those whose money they are 
investing, to bring about changes in companies when necessary, rather 
than selling their shares.29  
We look to the institutions in particular, with the backing of the 
Institutional Shareholders’ Committee, to use their influence as owners to 
ensure that the companies in which they have invested comply with the 
Code. The widespread adoption of our recommendations will turn in large 
measure on the support which all institutional shareholders give to them. 
“The obligation on companies to state how far they comply with the Code 
provides institutional and individual shareholders with a ready-made 
                                                                                                                                          
 26. Corporate governance codes in the U.K. have developed thusly: from the Cadbury Code of 
1992, to revisions in 1995 made after the Greenbury Committee’s report on executive 
remuneration; then in 1998 after review by the Hampel Committee, and again in 2003 following 
the Higgs review of the role of non-executive directors; and then in 2006 and 2008, before the 
Walker Review findings culminated in the revised and re-named UK Corporate Governance Code 
of 2010. 
 27. Sridhar Arcot, Valentina Bruno & Antoine Faure-Grimaud, Corporate Governance in the 
UK: Is the Comply or Explain Approach Working?, 30 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 193, 193 (2010); 
Ian MacNeil & Xiao Li, “Comply or Explain”: Market Discipline and Non-Compliance with the 
Combined Code, 14 CORP. GOVERNANCE 486, 492, 494 (2006). 
 28. COMM. ON THE FIN. ASPECTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE 
ON THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ¶ 6.6 (1992) [hereinafter CADBURY 
REPORT], available at http://www.jbs.cam.ac.uk/cadbury/report/index.html. 
 29. Id. ¶ 6.10.  
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agenda for their representations to boards. It is up to them to put it to good 
use.”30  
The soft law on corporate governance in the U.K. has developed in 
order to boost institutional shareholder monitoring as a form of private 
order beneath the corporate structure. Such monitoring is couched in terms 
of institutional shareholders’ own private investment interests and is not 
framed with reference to any other external welfare objectives. 
II. THE U.K. STEWARDSHIP CODE 
In the wake of the U.K. banking crisis 2008–2009, institutional 
shareholders have been accused of having been “asleep.”31 The critique is 
that institutional shareholders have been uncritical of risky business 
practices in their investee banks and should have monitored Board risk 
management.32 Although the European Commission Green Paper 
acknowledges that the lack of critical scrutiny by institutional shareholders 
in financial institutions may be a “special case” due to the complexity of 
banking businesses, the Paper nevertheless points out that shareholder 
apathy is a chronic problem in listed companies with dispersed ownership.33 
If the quality of monitoring by institutional shareholders is, nevertheless, 
consistent with their private investment objectives, why then are 
institutional shareholders criticized? Such criticism may arguably be 
unwarranted as institutional shareholders should have contractarian 
freedom, within the contractarian paradigm of corporate governance, to 
determine how and for what purpose their monitoring is carried out. The 
critique against the perceived laxity of institutional shareholders is based on 
a different expectation of the purpose of corporate governance. The Walker 
Review and the Stewardship Code pay tribute to this other expectation; and 
on this basis, this Article argues that there is potential for the introduction 
of a theoretical shift from the shareholder-centered contractarian paradigm. 
The position taken by the Walker Review and the Stewardship Code is 
nevertheless not entirely groundbreaking. This Article attempts to map out a 
possible theoretical trajectory going forward in order not to lose the 
momentum of reform. 
                                                                                                                                          
 30. Id. ¶ 6.16 (emphasis added).  
 31. Hughes, supra note 1; Burgess, supra note 1; see also Ebrahimi, supra note 1. 
 32. WALKER REVIEW, supra note 2, ¶¶ 5.10–.11 
 33. Commission Green Paper on the EU Corporate Governance Framework, ¶ 2, COM (2011) 
164 final (Apr. 5, 2011) [hereinafter Commission Green Paper], available at http://ec.europa.eu 
/internal_market/company/docs/modern/com2011-164_en.pdf.  
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A. THE WALKER REVIEW AND BEYOND 
The Walker Review of corporate governance in U.K. banks and other 
financial industry entities,34 in the wake of the global financial crisis, 
provides the key context for the Stewardship Code. The Review examines 
the extent to which corporate governance could have contributed to the 
failure of certain banks in the U.K. and provides many recommendations to 
strengthen Boards, risk management, and the role of institutional 
shareholder monitoring.35 The Report opines that shareholder engagement is 
important in the public interest, videlicet: 
The potentially highly influential position of significant holders of stock in 
listed companies is a major ingredient in the market-based capitalist 
system which needs to earn and to be accorded an at least implicit social 
legitimacy. As counterpart to the obligation of the board to the 
[institutional] shareholders, this implicit legitimacy can be acquired by at 
least the larger fund manager through assumption of a reciprocal 
obligation involving attentiveness to the performance of investee 
companies over a long as well as a short-term horizon. On this view, those 
who have significant rights of ownership and enjoy the very material 
advantage of limited liability should see these as complemented by a duty 
of stewardship. This is a view that would be shared by the public, as well 
as those employees and suppliers who are less well-placed than an 
institutional shareholder to diversify their exposure to the management 
and performance risk of a limited liability company.36  
The references to “social legitimacy” in a market-based capitalist 
system, and to the “stewardship” of equity providers, show an interesting 
contrast with the quotations above in the Cadbury Report. These references 
refer to both private and public interest notions in institutional shareholders’ 
investment role; that is, because investment, particularly by institutions, is 
backed by social legitimacy, the investment role carries with it stewardship 
responsibilities. 
The contextual reference to the Walker Review, which precedes the 
Stewardship Code, should be taken together with the Principles in the Code 
in order to discern if a theoretical shift in corporate governance theory has 
been encouraged. I argue that, considering stakeholder and social 
responsibility issues, the key features of the Code on long-termism and 
holistic notions of stewardship encourage a move away from the 
shareholder-centered contractarian model in corporate governance theory. 
On the other hand, one could argue that the Stewardship Code does nothing 
groundbreaking in terms of corporate governance theoryt affirms the 
                                                                                                                                          
 34. Walker Review, supra note 2.  
 35. Id. ¶ 5.9.  
 36. Id. ¶ 5.7 (emphasis added).  
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monitoring position of institutional shareholders, but more explicitly sets 
out how monitoring may be made optimal. In this respect, it merely fleshes 
out more of the facilitative framework to assist in private contractarian 
monitoring. The following will examine the nature of monitoring, as 
envisaged in the Stewardship Code, in order to see if the Code still endorses 
a shareholder-centered contractarian view of institutional shareholders’ 
corporate governance role. 
The Walker Review of Corporate Governance in Banks and Financial 
Institutions in the U.K. advocates that the future of institutional shareholder 
activism should be an exercise in stewardship. The Review states: 
Experience in the recent crisis phase has forcefully illustrated that while 
[institutional] shareholders enjoy limited liability in respect of their 
investee companies, in the case of major banks the taxpayer has been 
obliged to assume effectively unlimited liability. This further underlines 
the importance of discharge of the responsibility of [institutional] 
shareholders as owners, which has been inadequately acknowledged in the 
past.37 
The enactment of the Stewardship Code is not confined to investing in 
financial institutions that may be supported by the lender of the last resort 
and government bailout. The Stewardship Code extends generally to 
institutional shareholders investing in the corporate sector. The general 
application of the Stewardship Code would require that institutional 
shareholders regard “stewardship” as a tenet of investment, and should 
require the notion of “stewardship” to characterize the responsibilities 
accompanying investment generally. But what does “stewardship” mean? 
Institutional investors are already subject to legal obligations of trusteeship 
that are imposed on them in the capacity of managing pension funds and 
insurance savings. Thus, what would “stewardship” encompass that is not 
already captured in the legal relationship of trusteeship between 
institutional funds and their beneficiaries? 
It is arguable that the characterization of “stewardship” is not merely a 
reiteration of the status quo, being that investment managers owe duties to 
funds, and that funds owe trusteeship duties to beneficiaries.38 
“Stewardship” seems to include notions of public interest and 
accountabilitythat institutional investors should monitor the corporate 
sector not only in the interests of the long-term savers who invest in those 
institutional funds, but also for the long-term well-being of the economy as 
a whole. This is similar to the “universal ownership” model that Hawley 
and Williams advocate: institutional monitoring should act as a “bridge 
                                                                                                                                          
 37. Id. at 12.  
 38. See generally Iris H-Y Chiu, Stewardship as Investment Management for Institutional 
Shareholders, 32 COMPANY LAW. 65, 65–67 (2011) (setting forth the argument). 
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between public policy, corporate governance and the well-being of 
[beneficiaries].”39 This characterization of institutional shareholder 
monitoring would go beyond the notion of shareholder monitoring as an 
outworking of the agency problem40 in the private order of the corporation. 
Such monitoring is also intended to be a form of governance that takes into 
account the wider public interest and social good. 
The Stewardship Code requires that, as a matter of stewardship, 
“[i]nstitutional [shareholders] should monitor their investee companies.”41 
Such “monitoring” includes seeking to be satisfied that corporate 
governance arrangements are robust, carrying out meetings with company 
directors and/or the Chairman of the Board, maintaining records of such 
meetings, considering the use of voting power, and attending general 
meetings.42 “Monitoring” also includes the “escalation” of shareholder 
engagement where it is appropriate to do so in order to protect and enhance 
shareholder value, and may include intensifying meetings with Board 
members, making public statements, and even requisitioning general 
meetings.43 The “monitoring” is couched in terms of protecting, and under 
Principle 4, “enhancing” shareholder value.44 In this way, it may be argued 
that the “monitoring” in the Stewardship Code is an outworking of private 
interestthat institutional shareholders monitor Boards in their private 
investment interests. If so, the Stewardship Code may be regarded as a 
standardized bargain between shareholders and the corporation in order to 
protect shareholders’ interests as capital suppliers with a residual claimant 
status. The Stewardship Code seems not to have broken any new 
ideological ground. 
Nevertheless, there are a few features of the Stewardship Code that 
seem to indicate a move away from treating shareholder monitoring as an 
essentially private matter; for example, the reference to “long-term 
[performance]” of companies in the Preface to the Code—it is curious, 
however, that this is not further embodied in the Principles.45  
                                                                                                                                          
 39. James P. Hawley & Andrew T. Williams, The Universal Owner’s Role in Sustainable 
Economic Development, in RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT 217, 223 (Rory Sullivan & Craig 
MacKenzie eds., 2006) (quoting Mark Mansley & Andrew Dlugolecki, Climate Change: A Risk 
Management Challenge for Institutional Investors 12 (Universities Superannuation Scheme, Ltd. 
2001), available at http://www.uss.co.uk/Documents/USS%20Climate%20Change%20-
%20A%20RIsk%20Management%20Challenge%20for%20Inst%20Investors%20SUMMARY%2
02001.pdf). 
 40. See generally JENSEN & MECKLING, supra note 17 (discussing the role of monitoring in 
the agency problem). 
 41. UK STEWARDSHIP CODE, supra note 5, princ. 3 (emphasis added). 
 42. Id.  
 43. Id. princ. 4. 
 44. Id.  
 45. See generally UK STEWARDSHIP CODE, supra note 5. Note that the only place where the 
Stewardship Code mentions the “long-term” is in the preface. 
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It is not clear if “long-term performance” is couched in financial terms 
or extends more holistically to the well-being of the company in its 
contribution to human and economic progress. It is arguable that the 
Stewardship Code’s preference for the “long-term horizon” of institutional 
shareholders is consistent with the “enlightened shareholder value” rhetoric 
championed by policy-makers in the reforms leading up to the Companies 
Act.  
The “enlightened shareholder value” model underlies section 172 of the 
Companies Act dealing with directors’ fiduciary duties to promote the long-
term success of the company, taking into account matters relating to the 
interests of stakeholders such as employees and the community, and to 
responsibility for the environment.46 Although the “enlightened shareholder 
value” model pertains to defining the scope of directors’ duties,47 it also 
paints a picture of what shareholders’ interests should be. The “enlightened 
shareholder” is the benchmark of a hypothetical shareholder who is 
interested in the long-term well-being and performance of the company, and 
its social and environmental impact. The “enlightened shareholder value” 
model arguably provides a normative framework for shareholder behavior, 
and an investment approach toward long-term performance, with such long-
term performance being a holistic rather than a narrowly financial measure. 
On the whole, the Stewardship Code seems to encourage “patient capital”48 
as key to stewardship. 
Principle 4 of the Stewardship Code envisages the possibility of 
escalated monitoring in view of “risks arising from social and 
environmental matters.”49 This is arguably consistent with the “enlightened 
shareholder value” model mentioned above. Principle 4 may be setting out 
a normative principle that institutional shareholders should be concerned 
about corporate social responsibility matters, thereby requiring institutional 
shareholders to move away from narrowly focusing on financial 
                                                                                                                                          
 46. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 172(1) (U.K.). 
 47. See Andrew Keay, Enlightened Shareholder Value, The Reform of the Duties of Company 
Directors and the Corporate Objective, 2006 L.M.C.L.Q. 335, 360–61 (Eng.). See generally 
Andrew Keay, Moving Towards Stakeholderism? Constituency Statutes, Enlightened Shareholder 
Value, and More: Much Ado About Little?, 22 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 1 (2011) [hereinafter Keay, 
Moving Towards Stakeholderism] (analyzing section 172 of the 2006 Companies Act). 
 48. Term used for “long-term capital” during the proceedings of a symposium hosted by the 
CFA Centre for Financial Integrity Business Roundtable Institute for Corporate Ethics. See 
generally CFA Centre for Fin. Integrity/Bus. Roundtable Inst. for Corporate Ethics, Symposium 
Report, Breaking the Short-Term Cycle: Discussion and Recommendations on How Corporate 
Leaders, Asset Managers, Investors and Analysts Can Refocus on Long-term Value (2006) 
[hereinafter Breaking the Short-Term Cycle] (summarizing symposium proceedings), available at 
http://www.darden.virginia.edu/corporate-ethics/pdf/Short-termism_Report.pdf. 
 49. UK STEWARDSHIP CODE, supra note 5, princ. 4. 
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performance and to take a more holistic view of corporate performance 
including its impact on wider society.50  
It could be argued that institutional shareholders’ concern for social 
responsibility and environmental matters could be completely within the 
realm of their private investment interest, as a corporation’s energy savings 
or avoidance of environmental or tortious liability could affect financial 
performance. In this way, Principle 4 does not require institutional 
shareholders to balance their private investment interests against social or 
environmental impact. It could be argued that Principle 4 may be seeking a 
convergence of institutional shareholders’ private interests with the public 
interest of communitarian concerns, so that beneficial social or 
environmental outcomes could by the way be attained.51 This would not 
amount to a call to social activism. Although an undertone of public interest 
can be detected in the reference to social and environmental matters in 
Principle 4, Principle 4 does not advocate the more radical embrace of 
social activism. 
Academic literature has shown that there is still an indeterminate link 
between corporate social responsibility and financial performance;52 hence, 
there may arguably be no natural convergence between institutional 
shareholders’ private investment interests and corporate social 
responsibility. If so, could Principle 4 then be regarded as providing a 
normative benchmark for shareholder behavior toward a form of social 
activism? The enlightened shareholder value rhetoric provides some 
encouragement toward a normative model of shareholder behavior, so that 
institutional shareholders engage not only for their “own good,” but also in 
considering the “good of others.” Although Principle 4 is not overtly 
                                                                                                                                          
 50. See Simon Deakin, Squaring the Circle? Shareholder Value and Corporate Social 
Responsibility in the U.K., 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 976, 978, 980, 986 (2002). 
 51. See, e.g., Steve Waygood, Measuring the Effectiveness of Investor Engagement: GSK and 
Developing Country Access to Essential Medicines, in RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT, supra note 39, 
at 206, 212. 
 52. Michael L. Barnett & Robert M. Salomon, Beyond Dichotomy: The Curvilinear 
Relationship Between Social Responsibility and Financial Performance, 27 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 
1101, 1105–06 (2006). Some studies generally supporting a positive correlation are as follows: 
Marc Orlitzky, Links between Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Financial 
Performance: Theoretical and Empirical Determinants, in 2 CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 41 (José Allouche ed., 2006); Laura Poddi & Sergio Vergalli, Does Corporate 
Social Responsibility Affect the Performance of Firms? (FEEM, Working Paper No. 52.2009, 
2009), available at http://www.feem.it/userfiles/attach/Publication/NDL2009/NDL2009-052.pdf; 
Jeffrey P. Katz, Eric Higgins, Marsha Dickson & Molly Eckman, The Impact of External 
Monitoring and Public Reporting on Business Performance in a Global Manufacturing Industry, 
48 BUS. & SOC’Y 489 (2009). Other studies finding a negative correlation are as follows: Stephen 
Brammer, Chris Brooks & Stephen Pavelin, Corporate Social Performance and Stock Returns: 
UK Evidence from Disaggregate Measures, 35 FIN. MGMT. 97 (2006); Leonardo Bechetti & 
Rocco Ciciretti, Corporate Social Responsibility and Stock Market Performance (CEIS: Ctr. for 
Econ. & Int’l Studies, Working Paper No. 79, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract 
=897499. 
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endorsing social activism, it is still important to note the encouragement 
toward a holistic consideration of corporate well-being. Perhaps, short of 
social activism, Principle 4 could be normativizing a form of institutional 
shareholder governance that avoids negative externalities. 
Principle 5 envisages that institutions may step up engagement in 
collective terms especially “at times of significant corporate or wider 
economic stress, or when the risks posed threaten the ability of the company 
to continue.”53 Collective institutional shareholder engagement may take on 
a representative type of market governance for wider social concerns, 
beyond the atomistic concerns of investment purposes. The reference to 
“wider economic stress” likely refers to concern for the public interest.54 
Principle 5 thus seems to have the effect of framing shareholder 
engagement within normative expectations that are consistent with public 
interest objectives. 
Principle 5, in this Article’s view, indicates that institutional 
shareholders are being overtly regarded as part of the governance landscape 
in furtherance of public interest. Regulation theory, in the wake of the 
decline of the state55 and central command-and-control type mechanisms in 
regulatory control, has been advocating theoretical models of de-centralized 
governance56 where various actors, public or private, may act in a 
“regulatory space”57 to exert governance and discipline on each other. 
Although different theories present different levels of optimism as to how 
the private interests of various actors may coincidentally produce beneficial 
public interest effects, and how the patchwork of governance forces may 
                                                                                                                                          
 53. UK STEWARDSHIP CODE, supra note 5, princ. 5. 
 54. Part I of the WALKER REVIEW, supra note 2, discusses stewardship as a part of the social 
legitimacy of shareholding. 
 55. For views on the decline of the nation state, see generally PREM SHANKAR JHA, THE 
TWILIGHT OF THE NATION STATE: GLOBALISATION AND CONTEMPORARY STUDIES ON THE 
NATION STATE (Anne Marie Smith & Kate Nash eds., 2006); GOVERNANCE WITHOUT 
GOVERNMENT (James N. Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Czempiel eds., 1992). 
 56. Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in 
Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 344 (2004). See generally Julia Black, 
Critical Reflections on Regulation, 27 AUSTRALIAN J. LEGAL PHIL. 1 (2002) [hereinafter Black, 
Critical Reflections on Regulation] (exploring the requirements for, and implications of, 
“decentralized” regulation); Julia Black, Enrolling Actors in Regulatory Systems: Examples from 
UK Financial Services Regulation, 2003 PUB. L. 63 (U.K.) [hereinafter Black, Enrolling Actors in 
Regulatory Systems] (analyzing the role of regulatory capacity and regulatory enrollment in de-
centered and fragmented regulation); Julia Black, Mapping the Contours of Contemporary 
Financial Services Regulation, 2 J. CORP. L. STUD. 253 (2002) [hereinafter Black, Mapping the 
Contours] (arguing that financial services regulation is fragmented and examining such regulation 
through a de-centered analysis of regulation); Scott Burris, Michael Kempa & Clifford Shearing, 
Changes in Governance: A Cross-Disciplinary Review of Current Scholarship, 41 AKRON L. REV. 
1 (2008) (providing an overview and analysis of governance theory and reform). 
 57. See Colin Scott, Analysing Regulatory Space: Fragmented Resources and Institutional 
Design, 2001 PUB. L. 329, 331 (U.K.). See generally id. at 330–34 (describing the “regulatory 
space” metaphor). 
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work together,58 the direction that is clear is that we are increasingly 
looking for governance potential in a range of different actors, private or 
public. Hence, Principle 5 can be seen in this light: institutional 
shareholders, being proximate to their investee corporations, and given 
certain proprietary rights of control through voting and management 
accountability, are in a good position to be enrolled in the governance 
landscape. 
On the whole, the Stewardship Code admonishes institutional 
shareholders to take on a more explicit governance role, thereby aligning 
private and public interests and going beyond mere private interest. It may 
be argued that the Financial Reporting Council applies on a comply-or-
explain basis, and the Council has explicitly stated that some asset 
managers may legitimately choose not to engage if that is not consistent 
with their investment strategies, as long as an explanation is provided for 
that purpose.59 This Article, however, argues that as the Stewardship Code’s 
default position is that of stewardship and engagement, and is likely 
targeted at large and significant pension funds and asset managers, the 
exceptions to the Stewardship Code do not undermine the expectations in 
the Stewardship Code with respect to changing shareholders’ governance 
role. Further, this Article argues that there are two key features in the 
Stewardship Code that fundamentally challenge the shareholder-centered 
contractarian paradigm of corporate governance as they are inconsistent 
with the contractarian freedom that should be enjoyed by institutional 
shareholders in their corporate governance role. These two features are: the 
call to monitor for the long-term, and the consideration of wider good in the 
exercise of monitoring. 
1. Long-Termism 
Many commentators argue that, left to their own tendencies, 
institutional shareholders are largely short-termist in nature. Dallas, arguing 
                                                                                                                                          
 58. Compare John S.F. Wright & Brian Head, Reconsidering Regulation and Governance 
Theory: A Learning Approach, 31 L. & POL’Y 192, 211 (2009) (finding that the “Responsive 
Regulation” theory, which “provides a normative frame based on public-interest considerations[,]” 
may be applied most effectively where “industry interests are very strong and third-party voices 
are relatively weak”), with Liesbet Hooghe & Gary Marks, Unraveling the Central State, but 
How? Types of Multi-Level Governance, 97 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 233, 238 (2003) (concluding that 
“Type II governance,” where “a wide range of public and private actors who collaborate and 
compete in shifting coalitions,” is task-driven and “designed to address a limited set of related 
problems”). See also, Shann Turnbull, Self-Regulation, Address at the Ninth International 
Conference on Socio-Economics, University of Montreal, at 2, 4–5 (July 6, 1997) (arguing that 
self-regulation cannot work unless power is divided rather than absolute, power is shared by 
interested parties, and multiple independent and varied inputs of information are supplied to such 
parties), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=630041. 
 59. FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STEWARDSHIP CODE ¶ 27 (July 
2010), available at http://www.frc.org.uk/corporate/investorgovernance.cfm. 
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that human behavior, technological advances, and the market structures and 
legal frameworks are key to supporting a culture where capital constantly 
accesses opportunities and thus defines performance in shorter and shorter 
runs, presents a powerful account of how short-termism came to rule both 
financial markets and the non-financial business sectors.60 This focus on 
short-termism also causes non-financial business sectors to assess 
performance in shorter and shorter runs, further feeding back into capital 
needs.61 Short-termism, in other words, has naturally evolved in the 
financial and non-financial business sectors, and is a combination of both 
human behavior in managing risk and structural possibilities provided by 
technology and law. The behavior of institutional shareholders in markets 
such as the United States and U.K., dominated by equity capitalism, is also 
heavily characterized by short-termism.62 
Wong notes, from the practitioner’s point of view, that institutions such 
as pension funds and insurance companies diversify their portfolios by 
engaging different groups of asset managers to manage investments, and 
further, that investment managers are assessed quarterly and regular 
tournaments of asset managers are the norm.63 Such assessments are 
generally made with reference to financial performance. A couple of 
industry reports and surveys also confirm the overwhelming dominance of 
short-termism in institutions’ approaches to investing, and the frequent 
trading and exit behavior on the part of investment managers.64 Investment 
managers, hence, prefer to be able to see their performance measured in 
hard targets, which are financial in nature, and, therefore, tend to sell rather 
than monitor a company for indefinite gains and periods.65 
                                                                                                                                          
 60. See Lynne Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis and Corporate Governance, 37 J. 
CORP. L. 265, 293–322 (2011) (discussing the causes of short-termism in financial and non-
financial business sectors). 
 61. Id. at 310–16, 320–22 (discussing the spiraling problem of “myopia” in non-financial 
business sectors).  
 62. See ASPEN INST., OVERCOMING SHORT-TERMISM: A CALL FOR A MORE RESPONSIBLE 
APPROACH TO INVESTMENT AND BUSINESS MANAGEMENT 1–2 (2009) (describing the prevalence 
of short-termism in the United States), available at http://www.aspeninstitute.org/publications 
/overcoming-short-termism-call-more-responsible-approach-investment-business-management. 
Academic research has consistently argued that short-termism persists in the investment 
management patterns in the U.K. See, e.g., Andrew Jackson, Towards a Mutual Understanding of 
Objectives? Attitudes of Institutional Investors and Listed Companies to Corporate Governance 
Reforms, 9 CORP. GOVERNANCE 196, 198, 203 (2001); John Hendry, Paul Sanderson, Richard 
Barker & John Roberts, Responsible Ownership, Shareholder Value and New Shareholder 
Activism, 11 COMPETITION & CHANGE 223, 237 (2007). 
 63. Simon C.Y. Wong, Why Stewardship is Proving Elusive for Institutional Shareholders, 25 
BUTTERWORTHS J. INT’L BANKING & FIN. L. 406, 407 (2010). Academics have noted the same. 
Paul Cox, Stephen Brammer & Andrew Millington, Pension Fund Manager Tournaments and 
Attitudes Towards Corporate Characteristics, 34 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 1307, 1311 (2007). 
 64. Breaking the Short-Term Cycle, supra note 48, at 1; ASPEN INST., supra note 62, at 1–2. 
 65. Breaking the Short-Term Cycle, supra note 48, at 3; ASPEN INST., supra note 62, at 2; cf. 
Brian Bushee, The Influence of Institutional Investors on Myopic Investment Behavior, 73 
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Institutional shareholders’ “natural” corporate governance behavior is 
driven by their own investment needs, and short-termist trading and selling 
out are key features of such behavior.66 Does this mean that the 
“monitoring” envisaged under the shareholder-centered contractarian model 
of corporate governance is a myth? It could be argued that “monitoring” 
could also refer to such short-termist investment monitoring and selling out, 
particularly if the market for corporate control could exert a form of 
discipline on managers. Yet, Gaspar et al.’s research shows that short-
termist selling out to takeover bidders is motivated exclusively by 
institutions’ investment perspectives and there is little consideration for the 
investee company as such.67 Investee companies which have been bought 
out by short-termist institutions have tended to fare less well in the long-
term.68 Nevertheless, contractarian freedom is, by its nature, self-centered 
and not other-centered; hence, short-termist monitoring is still consistent 
with the private contractarian nature of institutional shareholders’ corporate 
governance role. 
The focus on long-termism, developed under the “enlightened 
shareholder approach” in the U.K. company law reforms in 2006, and now 
explicitly admonished in the Stewardship Code, is arguably contrary to the 
natural tendencies and practices in the investment industry. The kind of 
“monitoring” that would naturally evolve in a shareholder-centered 
contractarian model of corporate governance would be short-termist in 
nature: focused on financial performance and looking for opportunities to 
exit. The contractarian model would arguably foster and support these 
tendencies as a natural outworking of efficient contractual behavior. Hence, 
compelling institutions to favor “patient capital” introduces a constraint 
which does not arguably align with institutional shareholders’ natural 
tendencies.69 
                                                                                                                                          
ACCOUNTING. REV. 305, 306, 330 (1998) (finding that while institutional ownership can play a 
monitoring role to ensure that managers choose to maximize long-run value over short-term 
earnings targets, where such institutions exhibit “transient ownership characteristics,” the 
probability that such managers will make the inverse choice is significantly increased); Brian 
Bushee, Do Institutional Investors Prefer Near-Term Earnings Over Long-Run Values?, 18 
CONTEMP. ACCOUNTING. RES. 207, 212–13, 240 (2004) (finding that high levels of “transient” 
institutional ownership is associated with overweighting of short-term earning value and 
underweighting of long-term earning value, and concluding that the finding supports the notion 
that such ownership provides fund managers incentives for favoring short-term earnings over 
long-term value). 
 66. See Hendry et al., supra note 62, at 237. 
 67. See José-Miguel Gaspar, Massimo Massa & Pedro Matos, Shareholder Investment 
Horizons and the Market for Corporate Control, 76 J. FIN. ECON. 135, 136, 138–39 (2005). 
 68. Cf. id. at 138, 158–59 (finding that buyer firms with short-term investors have had worse 
underperformance in the long-run).  
 69. Wong, supra note 63, at 406. 
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Next, it will be argued that the regard that institutions need to have for 
the wider context or public interest is also contrary to a shareholder-
centered contractarian model of corporate governance. 
2. Wider Good 
The rhetoric in the Walker Review refers to “social legitimacy” in the 
institutional shareholders’ role, based on a “view . . . shared by the public” 
and by stakeholder groups.70 Hence, institutional shareholders’ governance 
role is not only based on contractarian speak and the agency problem. 
Rather, it is now stated that the role should be supported by public and 
stakeholder perception.71 This view can only be reconciled with the 
shareholder-centered contractarian ideology if we regard the public and 
stakeholders as all part of the contractarian fabric. Nonetheless, that would 
conflate the private nature of the corporation supported by the contractarian 
theory and the social purpose of the corporation supported by 
communitarian theories. Hence, how should we interpret the call to “social 
legitimacy” within the existing theoretical frameworks? Is social legitimacy 
and public interest to be accommodated within the contractarian ideology or 
without? If the contractarian theory regards corporate governance as 
essentially an issue of private order, then “public interest” notions are only 
accounted for in terms of market failures. But the Walker Review seems to 
go beyond market failures. 
Shareholder-centered contractarian ideology regards market failures to 
be impediments to shareholder monitoring due to information asymmetry or 
bargaining failures.72 To overcome such market failures, the existing legal 
framework already provides for securities disclosure regulation to empower 
institutional shareholders with information. Mandatory company law rules 
on general meetings, voting, and institutional shareholders’ approval for 
specific transactions73 facilitate shareholder monitoring and provide 
shareholder rights to overcome such market failures. The rhetoric in the 
Walker Review pertaining to “stewardship” does not deal with the market 
failures surrounding institutional shareholders’ monitoring role. Rather, it 
deals with ideas of social welfare—making shareholder monitoring 
beneficial to the wider community at large, and such wider community not 
being captured within the private order of the contractarian framework. 
Further, it will be discussed that shareholder stewardship, under the 
comply-or-explain regime, is also envisaged to become publicly 
                                                                                                                                          
 70. WALKER REVIEW, supra note 2, ¶ 5.7. 
 71. Id.  
 72. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 
1463–64, 1520, 1524 (1989). 
 73. Examples include substantial transactions or interested transactions. See Companies Act, 
2006, c. 46, §§ 190–214 (U.K.). 
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accountable, thereby explaining the Walker Review’s reference to the duty 
of stewardship as a construct of “social legitimacy” that complements the 
limited liability enjoyed by institutional shareholders. 
In sum, it is argued that the contextual framing of “stewardship” moves 
away from a shareholder-centered contractarian ideology of corporate 
governance. This is because “stewardship” does not accept the natural 
tendency of short-termism as an investment tenet, and thus introduces 
limitations to the contractarian freedom enjoyed by institutional 
shareholders in determining how best to deal with their investments. 
Additionally, the references to wider good in the Walker Review do not 
cohere with the private nature of shareholder monitoring under the 
shareholder-centered contractarian model of corporate governance. Further, 
the Financial Reporting Council now subjects the Stewardship Code to a 
comply-or-explain regime and encourages institutions’ investment 
managers, proxy voting agencies, and even foreign investors who now own 
more than 40 percent of the U.K.’s publicly listed equity,74 to adhere to the 
Stewardship Code. This Article argues that the comply-or-explain regime 
would also contradict the private nature of shareholder monitoring. Not 
only is shareholder monitoring subject to a form of normativization in the 
Principles of the Code mentioned above, institutional shareholders are 
themselves accountable under the comply-or-explain regime. Hence, the 
Stewardship Code does not seem to encourage the view that shareholder 
monitoring is a private activity framed by the contractarian and agency 
paradigms. 
It could be argued that institutions are accountable to their beneficiaries 
anyway, but this Article argues that the accountability framed under the 
comply-or-explain regime is different from that under fund management 
trusteeship, which is based on private law. The nature of accountability 
envisaged in the Stewardship Code is more public than private in nature. 
Principles 1, 2, 5, and 6 require public disclosure by institutions in relation 
to their stewardship responsibilities and the rendering of such.75 Such public 
disclosure would likely be monitored by the Financial Reporting Council 
and policy-makers, and hence the accountability in the discharge of 
stewardship is not limited to fund beneficiaries. The comply-or-explain 
model is likely to facilitate monitoring of institutional engagement, not by 
beneficiaries, but by policy-makers. Beneficiaries are likely to be too 
                                                                                                                                          
 74. Statistics as of December 2010. OFFICE FOR NATIONAL STATISTICS, OWNERSHIP OF UK 
QUOTED SHARES 2010 (Feb. 28, 2012), available at http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171778 
_257476.pdf. 
 75. UK STEWARDSHIP CODE, supra note 5, princs. 1, 2, 5, 6. Principle 1 deals with the 
monitoring policy generally, Principle 2 focuses on how institutions manage conflicts of interest 
in discharging stewardship responsibilities, Principle 5 requires public disclosure of any policies 
on collective engagement, and Principle 6 requires voting records to be publicly disclosed or an 
explanation for their nondisclosure. Id. 
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dispersed and indifferent to relate the engagement activities of their pension 
funds or insurance companies to the long-term performance of their 
savings. Hence, the Stewardship Code is intended to steer the modus of 
monitoring by institutional shareholders, not only for the purposes of 
protecting their private investment interests, but also as an exercise of 
governance that may deliver social good. Public disclosure also assists 
policy-makers and relevant regulators to understand and discern the impact 
of shareholder engagement on corporations, and possibly also establishes a 
platform of intelligence for policy-makers to consider options in 
governance. Principle 7 requires disclosure of details of the discharge of 
stewardship to beneficiaries, but does not say that such disclosure should be 
publicly made.76 Still, the institutions’ trade bodies, such as the National 
Association of Pension Funds and the Investment Management Association, 
publish almost yearly surveys going into some detail of how institutions 
engage and what is achieved. Hence, it is argued that institutional 
engagement will be looked at most closely by policy-makers and regulators, 
rather than by dispersed individual beneficiaries. Individual beneficiaries 
are unlikely to make the connections between how institutional stewardship 
in shareholder engagement translates into investment performance, or the 
ultimate provision of retirement or long-term savings. On the other hand, 
policy-makers and regulators would be interested in the quasi-governance 
role of institutions in the regulatory space. 
It can, however, be argued that the Stewardship Code represents a set of 
hypothetical default bargains that institutions would have struck with their 
beneficiaries, and that it does not depart from a dominantly private interest 
paradigm. But this Article argues that the Stewardship Code is unlikely to 
reflect beneficiaries’ preferences. Beneficiaries are likely to prefer that 
institutions have the freedom to engage as well as to sell, and would not 
likely place undue emphasis on engagement. As Tsuk-Mitchell explains, the 
key conceptualization of an “investor” has been one whose primary right is 
to sell out if unhappy with the investment, and not necessarily to participate 
in the internal reform of companies.77 Further, the hypothetical default 
bargain model breaks down especially in relation to Principle 5. Why would 
beneficiaries necessarily think that collective engagement by institutions in 
times of economic stress would be the ideal default bargain? Would not 
beneficiaries prefer institutions to rationally engage in individual wealth-
maximizing behavior in order to address their investment interests? 
Although the Stewardship Code is soft law, this Article is of the view that 
the approach of the Stewardship Code to normativizing aspects of 
shareholder monitoring, in addition to its comply-or-explain nature, 
                                                                                                                                          
 76. Id. princ. 7.  
 77. Dalia Tsuk Mitchell, Institutional Shareholders as Proxies: The Contours of Shareholder 
Democracy, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1503, 1514, 1563–64, 1570 (2006). 
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supports taking the view that the Stewardship Code signals the shifting 
away from a private contractarian approach to shareholder monitoring. 
Institutional shareholders are not merely required to align their private 
interests with wider concerns, but possibly to do more, as engagement, 
monitoring, public reporting, and collective engagement all require positive 
effort and cost. 
In the next Part, this Article will argue that although the Stewardship 
Code contains principles that indicate a move away from shareholder-
centered contractarianism, the theoretical shift does not swing to a 
communitarian conception of the corporation. This Part will suggest that the 
theoretical shift is based on elements of stakeholder theory, in particular 
elevating the position of the state as “key stakeholder” in the context of the 
U.K. bank bailout in 2008–2009. 
III. THE RISE OF THE “KEY STAKEHOLDERS” 
This Part first examines the models of communitarian theories in 
corporate governance, and argues that the Walker Review and the 
Stewardship Code, nevertheless, do not encourage a total embrace of 
communitarian theories of corporate governance. It will also argue, 
however, that the developments in the Walker Review and the Stewardship 
Code embody a limited conception of the stakeholder theory, what this 
Article will refer to as a “key stakeholders” approach. 
A. THE COMMUNITARIAN MODELS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
THEORY 
Although the contractarian theory dominates corporate governance 
theory and legal frameworks, the corporation has not always been regarded 
merely as a private order of arrangements. Berle’s and Dodd’s writings in 
the 1930s conceive of the corporation as a social entity and institution 
producing social impact, although they disagree on the channels of 
accountability for directors.78 
                                                                                                                                          
 78. Compare A. A. Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 
1049, 1074 (1931) (arguing that corporate powers must only be used for the ratable benefit of 
shareholders because, substantively, corporate law should be viewed as a more flexible branch of 
the law of trusts), with E. Merrick Dodd, For whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 
HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1147–48 (1932) (arguing that while Berle’s “trustee” theory is generally 
agreeable, it is disagreeable to view corporations as solely profit-makers for shareholders because 
corporations have social utility and should therefore bear responsibility for stakeholders), with 
Adolf A. Berle, For whom Corporate Managers are Trustees: a Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365, 
1367–68, 1370 (1932) (responding to Dodd by arguing that, in practice, the social utility of a 
corporation exists in the large number of shareholders and through their interconnectedness with 
other members of society, and that until a “clear and reasonably enforceable scheme” is 
developed, corporate responsibility should be directed toward making profits for shareholders). 
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Communitarian models of corporate law grasp the phenomenon that the 
sum of the corporation and its power are greater than its constituent parts, 
and therefore view corporate power as a social issue of concern. The 
concession theory posits that corporations are creatures of statute, and 
hence, there is not only a sense of public purpose in their existence, but that 
the state is also placed in an unquestioning position to impose regulation on 
corporations.79 This is possibly the earliest conception of a communitarian 
model of the corporation, derived from the chartered corporation in the 
eighteenth century. The concession theory is based on the organized 
collectivity of the corporation as an extension of certain social purposes, 
such as infrastructural building (railways) or empire building (companies 
that governed and exploited colonial resources such as the East India 
Company).80  
The concession theory has long waned in persuasion but communitarian 
conceptions of the corporation remain as theorists continue to observe a 
“semi-public” character in the organized collectivity of the corporation—
the “real entity.” Dodd observes that the “real entity” of the corporation is 
regulable and regulated, as its internal processes and its products entail 
social consequences such as employee relations, products liability, 
consumer rights, and so on.81 As corporations become major employers, 
centers of consumer outputs, and economic engines of growth, Kaysen 
comments that corporate power becomes social and political power.82 The 
investment of corporations into research or innovation may determine the 
economic growth of specific industries and public investment into 
education and training: the economic significance of corporations extends 
beyond efficiency and output to social progressiveness and distribution.83 
Marketing carried out by corporations shape social perceptions and 
consciousness, and eventually culture. 
                                                                                                                                          
 79. Mahoney argues that the statutory intervention only followed developments in the 
mercantile community that had been attempting to achieve the separateness of business activities 
from personal assets through various other means such as contract and trust, and hence the claims 
of the concession theory are overrated. See Paul G. Mahoney, Contract or Concession? An Essay 
on the History of Corporate Law, 34 GA. L. REV. 873, 884, 887–88, 892–93 (1999); see also 
Roberta Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 STAN. L. REV. 923, 937–38, 965–
66, 971, 992–93 (1984) (noting that even if corporate personality is now enshrined in statute, it 
does not mean that the corporation is of a public character or that a regulatory fiat over it is 
warranted). 
 80. See, e.g., JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE COMPANY: A SHORT 
HISTORY OF A REVOLUTIONARY IDEA 21, 47–49 (2003). Yet, Mahoney would argue that charters 
are for more self-interested purposes such as securing a monopoly. Mahoney, supra note 79, at 
887. 
 81. See Dodd, supra note 78, at 1148, 1150–51, 1153, 1161–62. 
 82. Carl Kaysen, The Corporation: How Much Power? What Scope?, in THE CORPORATION 
IN MODERN SOCIETY 85, 99 (Edward Sagendorph Mason ed., 1975). 
 83. See id., at 93, 94–96, 100, 102–03.  
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The “semi-public” character of the corporation is arguably minimized 
in the contractarian approach, which focuses on the “parts” of the 
corporation rather than its sum,84 and thus, produces a de-socializing and 
de-politicizing effect upon the trajectory of corporate law scholarship.85 
Contractual theorists also argue that the transactional actors in the 
corporation are often assumed to be rational transactors with narrow foci on 
economic objectives such as resource allocation,86 asset partitioning,87 and 
economic gain.88 Such a depiction of the transacting actors in the nexus 
dehumanizes these actors89 and encourages self-interested atomistic 
behavior such as “shirking and sharking”90 to arise. The conception of the 
corporation in individualistic terms under the contractarian theory is 
arguably responsible for perpetuating the behavioral problems of 
managerial power and “sharking”—that is, shareholder power exercised for 
selfish and short-termist objectives.91 Yet, the communitarian theorists who 
look at the sum of the corporation as well as its parts are not quite in 
agreement as to what the alternative vision might encompass.92 
                                                                                                                                          
 84. See generally Paul N. Cox, The Public, the Private and the Corporation, 80 MARQ. L. 
REV. 391 (1997) (examining the contractarian-communitarian debate, and arguing that traditions 
of contractarian theory have some overlap with communitarian premises and that corporate law 
may be viewed through a contractarian lens as being reliant on non-legally enforced social norms). 
 85. Professor Tsuk-Mitchell argues that the economic focus of corporate law steers corporate 
theory into the safe haven that is strictly opposite to the Marxist/leftist conceptions of corporate 
law, which are more social in nature, in an age when the cold war still loomed large. Dalia Tsuk, 
Corporations Without Labor: The Politics of Progressive Corporate Law, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 
1861, 1864, 1909–11 (2003). 
 86. KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANISATION 17–18, 20–22 (1974). 
 87. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 
Yale L.J. 387, 392–94 (2000). 
 88. DOUGLASS NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE 107–08 (1990). 
 89. Lawrence E. Mitchell, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 1477, 1479 (1993) [hereinafter Mitchell, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of 
Corporate Law] (citing ELIZABETH WOLGAST, ETHICS OF AN ARTIFICIAL PERSON (1992)); Alan 
Wolfe, The Modern Corporation: Private Agent or Public Actor, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1673, 
1688 (1993); see Lawrence E. Mitchell, Trust, Contract, Process, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE 
LAW 185, 194–97 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995). 
 90. Eric W. Orts, Shirking and Sharking: A Legal Theory of the Firm, 16 YALE L. & POL’Y 
REV. 265, 327 (1998). 
 91. “Shirking” is characterized as an agent “slacking off” to the detriment of the principal, 
while “sharking” is characterized as the principal’s abuse of power and authority to the detriment 
of the agent. Id. at 278, 280.  
 92. See Joel Seligman, Foreword to PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW, supra note 89, at ix–x. 
For a critique of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, see generally Stephen Bainbridge, 
Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian Critique of Progressive Corporate Law 
Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856 (1997). 
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B. THE CORPORATION AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCT AND CITIZEN 
One communitarian conception of the corporation is that it is an 
organized collective that is part of the social fabric. This perspective places 
importance on the external and collective dimension of the corporation as a 
“real entity” in society and community, and therefore, demands are placed 
on corporations to have legal and social rights and duties and to participate 
in social life. Earlier commentators, such as Blumberg, see corporations as 
having a role to play in mitigating racial inequality in America by 
promoting equal opportunities in employment, and by being involved in 
philanthropy and social giving.93 Parkinson, commenting in the 1990s, also 
advocates that “social activism” is part-and-parcel of corporate 
responsibility, involving charitable giving and support for community.94 
This is also consistent with Mitchell’s and Ripken’s arguments that the 
corporation should be perceived as a “person,” and hence corporate law 
should play a part in “humanizing” the corporate personality in order to 
encourage a holistic existence of the corporation within the social fabric.95 
Wheeler, in the U.K., advocates that corporations should participate 
actively in the social fabric, partnering regional development causes and 
steering profit-making along virtue ethics in order to become a “social 
citizen.”96 Solomon, in his contribution to the Progressive Corporate Law 
volume, also advocates the communitarian conception of the corporation as 
a form of humanomics—that is, a collective entity that may be formed not 
only for private enterprise, but also for responsible and sustainable use of 
resources, including labor.97  
The “socialization” of the corporation, as discussed above, is, however, 
not the dominant paradigm in the communitarian camp. The concern with 
adopting this communitarian perspective as the theory of the corporation is 
that the notions of libertarian rights in property and contract may be 
undermined.98 This undermining of libertarian notions of individualist 
empowerment may give way to regulatory intervention and control, thereby 
allowing the regulatory state to assume concentrated power over economic 
                                                                                                                                          
 93. Phillip I. Blumberg, The Politicalization of the Corporation, 26 BUS. LAW. 1551, 1551, 
1582–84, 1586–87 (1971). 
 94. JOHN E. PARKINSON, CORPORATE POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY 266–67, 290–92 (1993). 
 95. Susanna Kim Ripken, Corporations are People Too: A Multi-Dimensional Approach to the 
Corporate Personhood Puzzle, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 97, 105–06, 175–77 (2009); 
Mitchell, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Corporate Law, supra note 89, 1487–88. 
 96. SALLY WHEELER, CORPORATIONS AND THE THIRD WAY 38–39, 42–44, 53, 71–72, 79–80 
(2002). 
 97. Lewis D. Solomon, On the Frontier of Capitalism: Implementation of Humanomics by 
Modern Publicly Held Corporations—A Critical Assessment, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW, 
supra note 89, at 281, 281–82. 
 98. Some discussion of the undermining of libertarian individual rights conceptions in the rise 
of the administrative state may be found in Jerry L. Mashaw, “Rights” in the Federal 
Administrative State, 92 YALE L.J. 1129 (1983). 
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activities. The latter half of the twentieth century has seen the rise of the 
administrative state in western economies such as the United States and 
U.K. (developments in the welfare and administrative state in the U.K. were 
arguably proliferated under the Labour government elected in 1945).99 
Perhaps private contractarian principles underlying corporate theory and 
law have been serving a countervailing ideological purpose. 
C. EXTERNALITIES-BASED PERSPECTIVE OF THE CORPORATION 
Another group of commentators advocate the communitarian 
conception of the corporation based on the social externalities caused by 
corporate activities. Greenfield, for example, writes extensively on the 
social costs resulting from corporate activities and calls for corporate law to 
be treated as “public law” in order to regulate externality-creating 
behavior.100 The “socialization” of the corporate entity may be manifest in 
specific regulation such as health and safety legislation, employment 
legislation, consumer protection and fair trading, anti-competitive 
regulation, occupier’s liability, products liability, and so on.101 These laws 
could intervene in internal corporate processes in order to achieve certain 
social outcomes. Products liability laws affect internal processes of quality 
control and checking; laws on equal opportunities demand internal 
processes to be put in place in order to monitor equal opportunities and 
create feedback processes. Bruner argues that, where the U.K. is concerned, 
the wide range of specific regulatory laws in respect of defined social issues 
such as employment rights, product safety, and so on, means that there is 
less need for corporate law to deal with such matters in corporate 
                                                                                                                                          
 99. See WILLIAM R. CORNISH & G. DE N. CLARK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN ENGLAND: 1750–
1950, at 464–66 (1989). 
 100. See generally KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW (2006) [hereinafter 
GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW] (challenging the dominant view of corporate 
law by showing that changes to the basic assumptions of corporate law and corporations could 
have positive results, and proposing some changes that may be achievable); Kent Greenfield, New 
Principles for Corporate Law, 1 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 89 (2005) [hereinafter Greenfield, New 
Principles for Corporate Law] (prescribing five principles for corporate regulation, founded upon 
the interests of society, that may further the public good). 
 101. See generally William W. Bratton, Welfare, Dialectic, and Mediation in Corporate Law, 2 
BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 59 (2005) (examining the objectives of corporate law; explaining why such 
objectives create resistances toward social responsibility and stakeholder empowerment; and 
explaining how corporate law has actually mediated tensions created in the shareholder-manager 
agency relationship in an “open-ended” and “piecemeal” manner, notwithstanding the theories 
posited for managing such tensions); Robert John Schultze, Book Note, Can This Marriage be 
Saved? Reconciling Progressivism with Profits in Corporate Governance Laws, 49 STAN. L. REV. 
1607 (1997) (arguing that external regulation targeting specific issues is the right approach to 
govern issues of a social effect resulting from corporate activity, and that it is wrong to reach into 
internal governance for the purposes of regulating for social effects). 
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governance.102 He argues that the greater presence of the welfare state in the 
U.K., and a gamut of specific social legislation, make it unnecessary for 
corporate law to cater to so many stakeholder “constituents” and social 
issues, hence placing the emphasis in corporate law on the internal private 
order of corporate governance.103 Instead of “socializing” the corporate law, 
public regulatory law may have the effect of trimming the parameters of 
corporate law so that it is concerned only with an internal core, thus 
maintaining the contractarian conception of corporate law. 
This Article agrees with Bruner’s observations that social issues, 
especially with regard to externalities, are often treated as outside of 
corporate law. Although the imposition of such regulatory law would 
undoubtedly change corporate and business practice, such public regulatory 
law is based on defined third-party externalities and does not purport to 
govern internal operations and corporate governance directly. This is why, 
notwithstanding that corporate governance codes have been promulgated as 
a response to social disquiet following the fall of the Bank of Credit and 
Commerce International in 1991,104 perceptions of excessive executive 
remuneration in 1995,105 and most recently, the social costs resulting from 
the global financial crisis of 2008–2009,106 such codes have remained as 
soft law in the U.K.  
Do the Walker Review and the Stewardship Code support the rise of a 
communitarian theory of corporate governance, given their seemingly 
common sympathy for public interest and wider good? This Article argues 
that they do not embrace the communitarian conception of socializing the 
corporation. 
The Stewardship Code does not seem to subscribe to the communitarian 
theories that are explicit on social activism. Where the Stewardship Code 
gets the closest to social activism, namely Principles 4 and 5, it is actually 
ambivalent about social activism. Principle 4 encourages institutions to 
monitor and consider the escalation of engagement where there are risks in 
respect of social and environmental matters. This may come close to a call 
toward activism for social responsibility. As discussed in Part I, however, 
the risks in respect of social and environmental matters may also refer to 
                                                                                                                                          
 102. See Christopher M. Bruner, Power and Purpose in the “Anglo-American” Corporation, 50 
VA. J. INT’L L. 579, 583–86, 603, 622, 634, 637–39, 649–653 (2010). 
 103. See id. In general, Bruner’s argument is that, in comparing the U.S. and U.K. climates, the 
amount of regulation, outside corporate law, protecting the interests of constituents other than 
shareholders, is inversely proportional to the amount of regulation, inside corporate law, required 
to safeguard such interests.  
 104. CADBURY REPORT, supra note 28, at 9, 11. 
 105. STUDY GROUP ON DIRECTORS’ REMUNERATION, DIRECTORS’ REMUNERATION: REPORT 
OF A STUDY GROUP CHAIRED BY SIR RICHARD GREENBURY 7, 11–12 (1995) [hereinafter 
GREENBURY REPORT], available at http://www.ecgi.org/codes/code.php?code_id=131. 
 106. WALKER REVIEW, supra note 2, at 9–12. 
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short-term and long-term financial risks to the company and to investors. 
As academic literature is still divided on the exact impact of corporate 
social responsibility on the financial performance of companies, Principle 4 
does not rule out financially-focused behavior. Principle 5 calls upon 
institutions to collectively engage in times of wider economic stress, and 
this again may seem to be an endorsement for social activism. In light of the 
context of the global financial crisis, however, Principle 5 may be better 
read as collective activism in order to safeguard the viability of a 
corporation so that its failure may not trigger contagion or systemic risk 
effects to the industry and to other sectors. Principle 5 does not advocate the 
socialization of any particular corporation to serve social purposes, and is 
perhaps closer to externality mitigation. On the whole, there does not seem 
to be a clear antithetical shift away to “communitarianize” or “socialize” the 
nature of the corporation, as advocated by the first strand of communitarian 
theorists discussed above. 
The theoretical shift that may be represented by the Walker Review and 
the Stewardship Code is not toward the archetypal opposite of shareholder-
centered contractarianism—communitarianizing the corporation. Rather, 
although not in the way stakeholder theorists advocate in terms of access 
and participation rights in corporate governance, the theoretical shift is 
closer to embodying a form of stakeholder theory. Neither the Stewardship 
Code nor the Corporate Governance Code107 goes as far as to address 
participatory rights for stakeholders, which is a key feature in the 
stakeholder models to be discussed below. Hence, the Stewardship Code 
cannot be regarded as embracing “stakeholder theory” as such, but possibly 
only as infusing certain stakeholder elements into an extended form of 
shareholder-centered contractarianism. This approach will be referred to as 
the “key stakeholders” approach in this Article. 
D. STAKEHOLDER THEORY 
Stakeholder theory is not strictly speaking a “communitarian view” as it 
does not emphasize the social purpose or nature of a corporation. Rather, it 
is a “processual” perspective, asking for stakeholders to be co-opted into 
corporate governance either by participation or by disclosure and 
accountability.108 Still, there seems to be an almost natural convergence 
                                                                                                                                          
 107. See sources cited supra notes 4–5. 
 108. Although some theorists go for stakeholder duties as well, others argue that activist 
institutional shareholders should be imposed with a fiduciary duty. Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, 
Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1262–65, 1307 (2006). The 
extension of duties in substantive law is not supported though. See Richard Saliterman, 
Perceptions Bearing on the Public Policy Dynamics of Corporation Law, 20 HAMLINE L. REV. 
261, 288, 331 (1996) (arguing that all constituents in the corporation are in it for self-interested 
purposes as well, and the needs of individual liberty could be severely compromised by ill-defined 
legal duties). 
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between theories sympathetic to the communitarian conception of corporate 
law and theories supporting increased involvement of stakeholders in 
corporate governance. This convergence appeals as the widening of the 
constituency base of the corporation draws more of society or community 
into the “boundary”109 of the corporation, arguably giving such 
“participation” a social or semi-public character. On the other hand, can 
such participation be open to all? If such participation cannot be open to all, 
then the selection of which stakeholders matter would create an inclusive-
exclusive effect, which may not differ from the wider contractarian 
conception of the corporation that includes a broad range of constituents 
beyond the organs of the company. In this respect, communitarian theories 
which ultimately emphasize processual approaches and stakeholder 
engagement may arguably not be very different in character from a 
contract-plus conception of the corporation. Nevertheless, stakeholder 
theories have the potential of introducing diverse negotiation in the 
“contractarian” order of the corporation, whereby the basis upon which 
stakeholders may be enrolled could be framed around alternative concepts 
such as externalities, justice, and social legitimacy, beyond capital-centered 
agency concepts. 
Early commentators suggest a form of stakeholder participation that is 
open to the public: that of the public election of directors of significantly 
large corporations such as General Motors in the United States,110 or of 
instituting “public directors” that have public accountability for the social 
effects of corporate decisions.111 These rather dated but bold proposals 
reach into corporate governance in order to regulate corporate decision-
making and activity, not merely as a private enterprise, but as a social 
construct. 
More contemporary commentators such as Freeman define stakeholders 
as “suppliers, customers, employees, [owners], the local community, and 
[managers].”112 This definition of “stakeholder” is based on the scope of 
persons who may be able to enter into a “Fair Contract” with the 
corporation.113 Greenfield advocates that stakeholders should be able to 
                                                                                                                                          
 109. There has been interesting research in economic geography on how the boundaries of the 
firm may be defined, and whether modern technological innovations changing the interface of 
firm interaction with “outsiders” now makes many “outsiders” part of the “firm” itself. See 
generally UNDERSTANDING THE FIRM: SPATIAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL DIMENSIONS (Michael 
Taylor & Päivi Oinas eds., 2006) (addressing, from an economic geography perspective, the gaps 
and fragmented thinking present in certain theories of the firm). 
 110. Blumberg, supra note 93, at 1560. 
 111. Arthur S. Miller, A Modest Proposal for Helping to Tame the Corporate Beast, 8 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 79, 91 (1979). 
 112. R. Edward Freeman, A Stakeholder Theory of the Modern Corporation, in THE 
CORPORATION AND ITS STAKEHOLDERS 126 (Max B.E. Clarkson ed., 1998). 
 113. See id. at 126, 129–34.  
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elect directors and share in the gains of the corporation;114 but, of particular 
relevance, his treatise, focusing greatly on the lack of redistributive justice 
to employees, argues for a fiduciary duty to be owed to employees due to 
the failures of relational contracting between corporations and 
employees.115 Sheehy advocates “stakeholder” participation in holding 
corporations to account for, and to benefit from, the distribution of gains 
from corporations.116 This version of stakeholder theory is based on a 
“justice” model that regards stakeholders as those who could be negatively 
affected by corporate activities. The externality connection then justifies 
Sheehy’s view that corporate gains should contribute to stakeholder wealth, 
and not just to the private wealth of capital providers, in order to 
compensate for such stakeholders’ forbearance of negative externalities. 
On the whole, although stakeholder theory again internalizes the 
conception of the corporation into a web of relationships, and does not 
communitarianize the corporation,117 stakeholder theory is more 
“progressive” in nature, as it allows the boundaries of accountability to be 
widened and allows for the enrollment of stakeholders based on concepts 
such as externalities, social legitimacy, and justice. With the dominance of 
the law and economics movement, and of libertarian political ideologies, 
the contractarian conception of corporate law as essentially private118 is an 
enduring one. Hence, it is not surprising that stakeholder theories do not 
advocate a completely public form of accountability. 
The Stewardship Code does not embrace stakeholder theory in terms of 
direct access to, and participation in, corporate governance. The real 
ideological shift in the Stewardship Code and the role of shareholder 
governance, in general, is a more nuanced one. The following will argue 
that the Walker Review and the Stewardship Code move toward embracing 
a key stakeholder, but not stakeholders generally. In the context of the 
global banking crisis which has given rise to the Walker Review and the 
Stewardship Code, the key stakeholder is the state or the relevant regulator. 
It will be argued that the Stewardship Code embraces a form of nuanced 
participation for the state or relevant regulator as “key stakeholder,” in the 
form of shareholder stewardship as accountability. The indirect nature of 
                                                                                                                                          
 114. Greenfield, New Principles for Corporate Law, supra note 100, at 108–09, 115. 
 115. See GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 100, at 63, 154, 159–70 
(arguing that extending a fiduciary duty to employees would increase “fairness,” which, in turn, 
would build the “trust and cooperation” required for “relational” contracting). 
 116. Benedict Sheehy, Scrooge—The Reluctant Stakeholder: Theoretical Problems in the 
Shareholder-Stakeholder Debate, 14 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 193, 235, 239–40 (2005). 
 117. See generally David Millon, Communitarianism in Corporate Law: Foundations and Law 
Reform Strategies, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW, supra note 89, at 1 (discussing and 
evaluating non-contractarian approaches to corporate law). 
 118. The dominance of the contractarian conception of corporate law is discussed in BRIAN R. 
CHEFFINS, THE TRAJECTORY OF (CORPORATE LAW) SCHOLARSHIP: INAUGURAL LECTURE AT 
THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE, OCTOBER 2003, at 43–57, 62–66 (2004). 
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the state’s role in the Stewardship Code attempts to introduce some balance 
to the shareholder-centered contractarian model of corporate governance 
without appearing to reintroduce concession type theories to reregulate 
economic activity by the back door. Yet, it may also be said that such a 
narrow and limited ideological move achieves little in introducing greater 
public interest rhetoric in corporate governance theory which has, for too 
long, been dominated by a private and insular contractarian paradigm. Part 
IV addresses this debate. 
E. THE KEY STAKEHOLDER APPROACH 
The context of the Stewardship Code is represented by the Walker 
Review of shortcomings in the corporate governance of banks and financial 
institutions, and how such sub-optimal governance has affected the U.K. 
banking crisis 2008–2009. For banks and systemically important financial 
institutions,119 the potential for state bailout, in times of crisis or failure, 
exists in order to prevent cascading devastating effects upon the financial 
sector and the general economy.120 Thus, where a failure of a systemically 
important bank or financial institution looms, it is not merely the 
shareholders and creditors of the institution that stand to bear residual risks 
and loss, the state may also be placed in a similar position. Such bailout 
would, however, benefit and protect shareholders and creditors at the 
expense of public money.121 In this context, an institutional shareholders’ 
“residual claimant” role in the contractarian paradigm may be mitigated by 
ultimate state support; hence, it could be argued that their monitoring role is 
no longer entirely “free” in the private contractarian sense, and that the 
state’s potential liability is to be regarded as a “stake.” Such a stake could 
either be supported by direct access and participation as per stakeholder 
theory, or by shareholder accountability, so that shareholder monitoring 
gives cognizance to, and is accountable for, the state’s “stake.” 
The state’s “stake” provides countervailing pressures to shareholders’ 
private contractarian pursuits which would naturally be self-centered and 
short-termist. The state as a stakeholder, however, is not framed in the 
terms that stakeholder theorists would expect in terms of direct participation 
and/or accountability. In this Article’s view, the state’s “stake” is expressed 
                                                                                                                                          
 119. Systemically important financial institutions means financial institutions whose collapse 
may trigger a series of devastating effects upon other institutions and the market generally, 
thereby affecting general economic well-being. See Rosa Lastra, Systemic Risk, SIFIs and 
Financial Stability, 6 CAP. MARKETS L. J. 197, 198–200, 209 (2011). 
 120. See id.  
 121. It has been argued that the position of the government is in need of recognition in bank and 
financial institution corporate governance. See, e.g., Peter O. Mülbert, Corporate Governance of 
Banks after the Financial Crisis: Theory, Evidence, Reforms §§ 2, 4.3.2.1 (European Corp. 
Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 151/2010, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract 
=1448118. 
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indirectly through the accountability, or “stewardship,” of institutions. 
Hence, the accountability inherent in the stewardship concept applies, in the 
particular case of financial institutions, to the accountability of shareholders 
to the state as a “key stakeholder” that mitigates shareholders’ residual risk. 
Nevertheless, in order to prevent open-ended policy interference by the 
state, “stewardship” has seven defined features and principles in the 
Stewardship Code.122 Thus, the ideological shift introduced by the 
Stewardship Code is an indirect recognition of a “key stakeholder” based on 
shareholder accountability. 
Yet, can this be said to be an ideological shift in corporate governance 
generally? The state’s “stake” in systemically important financial 
institutions may be argued to be unique to the financial sector. A number of 
commentators123 have argued that banks are special enterprises because they 
rely much more on deposits and other loans as a source of finance than on 
equity, and that, therefore, since losses would be shared with a large base of 
creditors, equity holders would prefer higher risk-taking in order to 
maximize returns. The corporate governance incentives in banks are thus 
likely to be in favor of risk-taking that exceeds what may be socially 
optimal. In this light, regulatory intervention such as micro-prudential 
regulation is warranted, and the role of the state as some form of a 
stakeholder is arguably more acceptable as a force mitigating market failure 
and potential social cost. 
Even if we accept that the state may be in a unique position of being a 
“key stakeholder” in the financial sector, it is not inconceivable that the 
state could be a “key stakeholder” in other sectors. State bailout has already 
occurred in another industry in the United States—the automotive industry. 
Policy-makers can determine that, besides banks, other industries have 
become socially or systemically important, although this does not 
necessarily mean that the state is always a “key stakeholder” in such 
industries. Indeed, this Article also suggests that besides the state as a 
potential “key stakeholder” in some sectors, the “key stakeholder” concept 
can be extended to encompass other stakeholders besides the state. 
The context of the banking crisis and unique corporate governance 
incentives in banks may be distinguished from corporate governance in 
other sectors. The Stewardship Code, however, has chosen to apply more 
broadly to the corporate sector. This Article argues that the extension of the 
Stewardship Code to other corporate sectors can be ideologically based on a 
new “key stakeholder” approach that can be extrapolated from the position 
of the state in relation to financial institutions and such other systemically 
                                                                                                                                          
 122. For the specific principles of “stewardship,” refer to UK STEWARDSHIP CODE, supra note 
5. 
 123. See Lucian Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247, 253, 
258–61, 275–76 (2010); Mülbert, supra note 121, §§ 4.1, 4.2.1–2.2, 6. 
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important corporations as policy-makers may determine. Such a “key 
stakeholder” approach is capable of being coherent and can bring about 
ideological changes to corporate governance theory. 
The “key stakeholder” position of the state, in relation to financial and 
other possibly systemically significant institutions, is based on the potential 
that the state may “bail out” or mitigate shareholders’ residual risk. The 
state could be a “key stakeholder” in sectors where there may be high levels 
of economic output or employment so that the social and economic 
significance of certain corporations may entail a characterization as 
“systemically or socially significant.”124 Further, other stakeholders in 
relation to other industries may also be placed in a similar position: that is, 
having the liability to absorb or mitigate residual risk without participatory 
rights in corporate governance. For example, the author of this Article has 
heard informally that some companies in the U.K. have implemented salary 
sacrifice schemes in order to report favorable finances during the economic 
downturn of 2008–2009 and to support the paying of dividends to 
shareholders. The role of employees in such a case could arguably amount 
to one of providing mitigation to shareholders’ residual risk. Such 
employees could be elevated to a “key stakeholder” position so that 
shareholder monitoring should take into account of, and be accountable to, 
them.  
A “key stakeholder” may be identified as one that mitigates 
shareholders’ residual risk, taking on a role of loss absorption or sharing. 
One is reminded of the Coasean bargain with respect to social cost125: that 
constituents affected by the cost of corporate activity may weigh the costs 
and benefits of such activity and come to actions that proportionately 
balance their private benefit derived from such activity against the private 
and social cost incurred. Hence, any “loss absorption” by stakeholders must 
be balanced against the private benefit that they obtain from the result of 
corporate activity; for example, manufacturing socially desirable goods.126 
In Coasean terms, “loss absorption” is framed within a private give-and-
                                                                                                                                          
 124. Currently, the term “systemically important” is used only in relation to financial 
institutions. See, e.g., FIN. STABILITY BD., POLICY MEASURES TO ADDRESS SYSTEMICALLY 
IMPORTANT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (Nov. 2011), available at http://www 
.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_111104bb.pdf. 
 125. See generally Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost 3, J.L. & Econ. 1, 2, 9–10 (1960) 
(examining the relationship between the Coasean bargain and social costs, and arguing that 
because a benefit somewhere is accompanied with a detriment elsewhere, and because a corrective 
measure to cure that detriment is accompanied by yet another detriment, the total net effect of all 
benefits and detriments should be regarded). 
 126. Such balancing is evident in the manufacture of paper products by plants that emit 
sulfurous odors. Paper products are socially desirable but odors are not, and where the community 
surrounding the plant is also employed by the plant, one can see the tensions that arise between 
the private benefit and the private and social costs. 
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take paradigm between stakeholders and the corporation, and is not 
socialized into a public interest issue. 
The “key stakeholder” approach may be accommodated within the 
contractarian paradigm of the corporation; and where the “key stakeholder” 
is the state, the contractarian web is widened to include the state and the 
constituents it represents. Such an approach has the potential of introducing 
wider social interest elements into a contractarian paradigm due to the 
private and public nature of “key stakeholders.”  
This Article argues that the “key stakeholder” approach is not 
inherently contradictory. Such an approach does not threaten to subvert the 
nature of the corporation or reintroduce communitarian concepts by the 
back door. As the Coasean corporation has taken on new dimensions in 
present times, from the local company to global multinational enterprises, it 
is arguably apt to extend the essentially private paradigm of Coasean social 
cost to embrace a mixture of private and wider social interest. This is 
because the scale of externalities that may entail from global corporate 
activity may become sufficiently significant.  
It may rightly be said that identifying “key stakeholders” of global and 
complex operations would likely be a diverse and complex exercise. There 
may be diverse groups of conflicting interests and an array of social and 
political driving forces supporting different groups to allow them to be 
heard. Still, this does not mean that “everyone” should become a “key 
stakeholder” and that the contractarian boundaries should collapse in favor 
of a communitarian conception. The key quality of “key stakeholders” is 
that they are in the position of mitigating shareholders’ residual risk in their 
loss absorption capacity. This may include a group of involuntary tort 
victims who have suffered from the cost-cutting measures of a corporation 
compromising on health and safety, but may not include an occasional tort 
victim of negligence. This Article acknowledges that there may be 
complexity in ascertaining “key stakeholders,” and contests between 
different groups of stakeholders, and between stakeholders and 
corporations, are likely to exist. Nonetheless, the next Part will suggest that 
the complex and negotiative landscape for stakeholders is not necessarily a 
drawback. 
In sum, there are two key ideological changes to the dominant 
shareholder-centered contractarian theory that are offered by the “key 
stakeholder” approach. First, the recognition of the key stakeholder’s 
indirect stake in the corporation that calls shareholders to stewardship 
mitigates shareholder-centric perspectives in corporate governance. Second, 
the notion of social or public interest can be infused into corporate 
governance theory either through the identity of the key stakeholder (for 
example, the state) whose objective may lie in social or public interest, or 
through the nature of the “stake” which may lie in preventing or mitigating 
private and social costs as a result of corporate activity.  
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This Article also regards the Stewardship Code as filling in where the 
“enlightened shareholder value” approach is lacking. The “enlightened 
shareholder value” approach recognizes the business case for asking 
shareholders and directors to integrate stakeholder welfare into corporate 
performance. Such an approach is instrumental127 in nature—that is to say, 
that stakeholders are not given cognizance as such, but only because 
stakeholder welfare may be related to the business case. The enlightened 
shareholder value approach views stakeholders from a self-centered 
perspective and is short of being really “enlightened”! The Stewardship 
Code, however, uses shareholder stewardship to express and account for 
another’s “stake.” This is an improvement from the instrumental view taken 
by the “enlightened shareholder value” approach, as the “stake” is given 
recognition as being other-centered, and not just perceived from the 
perspective of the corporation or the shareholder. Although the expression 
of the “stake” is not independent, and relies on shareholder stewardship, the 
accountability notion inherent in stewardship is one step toward indicating 
the other-centered nature of stewardship and away from the self-
centeredness of shareholder-centered contractarianism. 
One critique against the “enlightened shareholder value” approach is 
that it is unlikely to be effective in addressing stakeholder concerns without 
accountability to, and participation by, stakeholders.128 This Article argues 
that there is potential in the “stewardship” notion to make the indirectly 
expressed “stake” count, and thereby edge toward ideologically 
transforming corporate governance theory. The next Part will argue that 
much of this ideological potential lies in how stewardship is called to 
account, as the accountability of stewardship will show the extent to which 
the indirect stake of “key stakeholders” can be expressed in corporate 
governance. 
IV. THE IDEOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF STEWARDSHIP 
Although the Stewardship Code does not move very far from the 
shareholder-centered contractarian paradigm, this Article argues that it is 
mistaken to treat the “key stakeholder” approach, as embodied in the 
Stewardship Code, as insubstantially consequential. This Part will explore 
the possibilities in calling stewardship to account so that the “indirect stake” 
of “key stakeholders” can be made to count. This Part will also explore the 
                                                                                                                                          
 127. See T. Donaldson & L.E. Preston, The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation, 20 ACAD. 
MGMT. REV. 65, 71, 77–78 (1995) (describing the instrumental theory as one that posits a positive 
correlation between emphasizing stakeholder interests with positive business performance). 
 128. See generally Keay, Moving Towards Stakeholderism, supra note 47 (concluding that 
section 172 of the 2006 Companies Act provides only an appearance of focus on stakeholder 
interests). 
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weaknesses in the “key stakeholder” approach that may undermine the 
ideological developments suggested. 
As mentioned earlier, the accountability of stewardship is subject to a 
“comply or explain” regime, and such disclosure is likely to be scrutinized 
to a greater extent by regulators and policy-makers than by diverse 
beneficiaries in the institutions. What implications does this have for the 
accountability of stewardship, the means by which the indirect stake of 
“key stakeholders” is expressed? 
As much of the disclosure that institutional shareholders have to make 
in relation to stewardship is public disclosure,129 institutional shareholders 
could be scrutinized in their stewardship role by regulators and policy-
makers as well as stakeholder groups. 
A. THE GOVERNANCE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDERS 
Institutional shareholders may be scrutinized in their stewardship role 
by regulators and policy-makers who consider institutions as a force for 
governance. Contemporary scholarship in regulation theory has sought to 
maximize the governance potential of diverse actors in the regulatory space, 
as the state increasingly faces limitations in capacity, resources, and reach 
in exercising governance and control.130 As institutional shareholders have 
the proximity and resources to monitor investee corporations and actually 
do monitor such corporations, there is potential for the monitoring role to 
work as a force for governance. Regulators’ and policy-makers’ interest in 
institutions’ governance role will likely shape the pressures surrounding 
institutional accountability for stewardship. 
For example, the European Commission has overtly suggested that 
more effective “governance” of the corporate sector is needed. Its Green 
Paper has recommended that “better monitoring” of the comply-or-explain 
regimes of corporate governance codes in European Union (EU) Member 
States needs to be in place. Extensive harmonization of corporate 
governance codes in the EU has not yet taken place and Member States 
have adopted different approaches to the degree of legalizing corporate 
governance practices.131 Many EU Member States, however, have adopted 
the U.K.’s flagship approach of treating the Corporate Governance Code as 
soft law applying to listed companies and subjecting the listed companies to 
                                                                                                                                          
 129. See supra Part II. 
 130. See Black, Enrolling Actors in Regulatory Systems, supra note 56, at 64, 84; Lobel, supra 
note 56, at 344, 466; Scott, supra note 57, at 330, 347–52. See generally Black, Critical 
Reflections on Regulation, supra note 56 (arguing that conceptualizing regulation as 
“decentralized” will widen policy potential); Black, Mapping the Contours, supra note 56 
(arguing that analyzing financial services regulation from a decentered perspective, supplemented 
by “enrollment” analysis, may lead to improvements in the financial services regulatory system 
and its accountability).  
 131. See Commission Green Paper, supra note 33, ¶ 3.2.  
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a comply-or-explain approach.132 This comply-or-explain approach is 
intended to enroll institutional shareholders into meaningful consideration 
both of the corporate governance practices of their investee companies and 
of any deviations from the best practices found in the respective codes. In 
this respect, the comply-or-explain nature of corporate governance codes 
supports the private nature of institutional shareholders’ monitoring role, 
allowing them to decide on whether they are satisfied with the corporate 
governance practices of their investee companies. 
The Green Paper, however, observes that shareholder monitoring, 
especially in respect of deviations from the corporate governance codes, is 
lacking.133 This is because companies can get away with either not 
providing explanations for deviations from the Stewardship Code, or 
providing boilerplate and brief explanations that institutional shareholders 
do not pursue further.134 The Commission is of the view that companies’ 
corporate governance disclosures and practices need to be better 
monitored.135 Although it is not explicit what the perceived need for “better 
monitoring” is based on, the Green Paper goes on to suggest that “securities 
regulators, stock exchanges, or other authorities” could play a part in 
contributing to the monitoring of corporate governance disclosures and 
practices.136 This suggests that the Commission perceives a public interest 
element in monitoring the corporate governance of listed companies.  
Such a perception is not unfounded. Unchecked management may 
perpetuate fraud or risky decisions that could result in corporate failure. 
Corporate losses may not merely be regarded as a private matter of 
shareholder and creditor loss, but may sometimes become a matter of social 
loss affecting employees, stakeholders, and the community.137 Kay also 
                                                                                                                                          
 132. Examples of most EU Member State Codes may be found on the European Corporate 
Governance Institute’s website. Index of All Codes, EUROPEAN CORP. GOVERNANCE INST., 
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/all_codes.php (last visited Mar. 12, 2012). 
 133. Commission Green Paper, supra note 33, ¶ 3.1. 
 134. Arcot et al., supra note 27, at 193–94; see also Commission Green Paper, supra note 33, at 
196–97 (examples of good and bad codes). 
 135. Commission Green Paper, supra note 33, ¶ 3.2. 
 136. Id. ¶ 3.2.  
 137. An example is the consequent social losses following major corporate failures such as 
Royal Ahold and Enron. Commentators have attributed these corporate failures largely to 
governance failures. Abe De Jong, Douglas V. De Jong, Peter Roosenboom & Gerard Mertens, 
Royal Ahold: A Failure of Corporate Governance 2, 24 (European Corp. Governance Inst., 
Working Paper No. 67/2005, 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
_id=663504; Robert Rosen, Risk Management and Corporate Governance: The Case of Enron, 35 
U. CONN. L. REV. 1157, 1157–58 (2003). There is a much more tenuous link between corporate 
governance and generating positive social benefits through corporate social responsibility. See 
Ron Baukol, Address at Caux Round Table, Tokyo, Japan: Corporate Governance and Social 
Responsibility (Apr. 19, 2002), at 5–6, available at http://www.cauxroundtable.org/view_file.cfm 
?fileid=30; Laura Starks, Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility: What Do 
Investors Care About? What Should Investors Care About? (2009), EFA Keynote Speech at the 
University of Texas at Austin, in 44 FIN. REV. 461, 467. 
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writes of the failure of certain corporations as having more social and 
stakeholder implications than others, and of possibly a need to move away 
from the resistance against interfering with market-based forces when 
corporations fail. In this sense, shareholder monitoring may be expected not 
only to meet institutional shareholders’ private interests, but may function 
as a form of “market-based governance” for public interest objectives.138  
Market-based governance may be described as “the motivation of 
private interests to further the public good.”139 This is consistent with 
contemporary scholarship in regulation theory that posits seeking private 
actors to contribute to the regulatory space as discussed earlier. The 
European Commission is arguably affirming this perspective of shareholder 
monitoring in its Green Paper, in considering how the weaknesses of 
shareholder monitoring may be compensated for by enrolling, perhaps, 
securities regulators to monitor listed companies’ corporate governance 
disclosures and practices.140 Nevertheless, the implication of this is that 
corporate governance codes may be closer to becoming practically hard or 
regulatory law, as there is policy interest in scrutinizing adherence to the 
codes and reasons for deviations. The Stewardship Code may thus, in light 
of the Green Paper, be seen as a template for the governance role of 
institutional shareholders, which is increasingly being overtly articulated 
and could even be regulated in due course. In this light, there may be 
effective regulatory scrutiny of how institutional shareholders carry out 
stewardship and account for the wider purpose of corporate well-being and 
performance. 
B. SHAREHOLDER-STAKEHOLDER-COMPANY RELATIONS 
Next, shareholder stewardship may be used to frame arguments 
supporting shareholder activism and also arguments to check shareholder 
activism. The “other-centered” nature of stewardship is a platform which 
invites discourse. The company-shareholder-stakeholder relational 
paradigm is taken beyond “bargaining” as the contractarian theory posits. 
Rather, the discourse extends from “bargaining” to argument. Shareholders, 
management, and stakeholders can advance a discourse of different 
arguments. This new “negotiative” landscape of “argument” facilitates 
greater critical scrutiny into and debate about corporate behavior. 
                                                                                                                                          
 138. See John Kay, New Rules to Protect the Many from the Few, FIN. TIMES (June 7, 2011), 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6fb99fa4-914c-11e0-b1ea-00144feab49a.html (arguing for special 
insolvency regimes to deal with corporations whose social significance may be higher than others 
upon failure, such as utilities companies, banks, and care homes). 
 139. Rahul Dhumale, An Incentive-Based Regulatory System: A Bridge Too Far 13 (ESRC 
Centre for Bus. Research, Univ. of Cambridge, Working Paper No. 170, Jun. 2000), available at 
http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/pdf/wp170.pdf. 
 140. See Commission Green Paper, supra note 33, ¶ 3.2. 
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Shareholder engagement in a company may wax or wane in influence 
depending on a concept of “stakeholder salience.”141 The thesis is that 
stakeholders (including shareholders) with salient demands may more likely 
influence management, and hence, exert greater governance pressures in 
their corporate governance roles. Salient demands are those that are backed 
by power, legitimacy, or urgency. Power can only be exercised by 
shareholders as the legal framework provides for voting, exit, and 
engagement rights. Yet, legitimacy pressures could come from stakeholder 
reports, social and media reports, and publicity. Legitimacy pressures could 
also impact perceived urgency. 
Shareholder engagement could thus be based on legitimacy and urgency 
pressures that are exerted by stakeholder groups, even if the latter do not 
have direct participation rights in corporate governance. Often, such 
societal legitimacy is viewed by institutional shareholders as a useful 
springboard for engagement.142 Companies can, however, also use societal 
legitimacy or urgency pressures to countervail institutional engagement; 
and such use may provide a useful check on selfish use of engagement 
powers by institutional shareholders.143  
As legitimacy and urgency can be derived from stakeholder concerns, 
stakeholders, albeit with an indirect stake through shareholder stewardship, 
could be practically important in exerting corporate governance influence. 
Stewardship could be used to advance legitimate stakeholder concerns and 
could also provide a check against institutions advancing selfish or 
atomistic agenda that may not be welfare-inducing. A negotiative landscape 
in corporate governance can thus arise where the company, institutional 
shareholders, and the indirect representation of stakeholders’ legitimate or 
urgent pressures interact. Although stakeholders do not have a direct voice, 
and the dynamics of influence are shaped by institutional engagement and 
corporate manipulation, stakeholders could use public media to manipulate 
their arguments for legitimacy and/or urgency in order to shape the 
negotiations and discourse in corporate governance. 
The indirect power of stakeholders has been increasingly witnessed in 
the exertion of social responsibility pressures on corporations. The 
                                                                                                                                          
 141. E. James M. Gifford, Effective Shareholder Engagement: The Factors that Contribute to 
Shareholder Salience, 92 J. BUS. ETHICS 79, 96–97 (2010). 
 142. See id. at 81–82, 92–93. 
 143. For example, Rock has written extensively on his reservations on the benefits of 
institutional shareholder activism. See, e.g., Edward B. Rock, The Logic and Uncertain 
Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L. J. 445, 452–53, 505–06 (1991) 
(arguing that managers of such institutional-investor-institutions have substantial disincentives, 
but few incentives, to actively discipline corporate management and will, at best, be a 
“disinterested champion”); cf. Edward B. Rock, Controlling the Dark Side of Relational Investing, 
15 CARDOZO L. REV. 987, 988–90, 1030–31 (1994) (arguing that the risks of “relational” 
investing are great and difficult to minimize and control). 
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Corporate Responsibility movement has produced a loop of discourse, 
accountability in reporting, and perhaps also substantive change.144 The 
template of stewardship more overtly supports the role of stakeholder-based 
arguments in legitimacy and urgency and further invites possible scrutiny 
from regulators and policy-makers, as discussed above. Hence, the indirect 
stake of “key stakeholders” can be a powerful reflexive force for shaping 
the governance role of institutional shareholders. 
C. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LONG-TERMISM AND 
STAKEHOLDER WELFARE 
This Article also argues that business management research supporting 
the correlation between long-termism and greater stakeholder welfare 
would provide further impetus to support stakeholder arguments and their 
influence in the stewardship accountability regime under the Stewardship 
Code. Michael Porter advocates that contemporary businesses should turn 
to a “shared value” model so that shared value redefines what value creation 
means for business.145 “Shared value” incorporates long-term corporate 
success with societal and general economic well-being, and sees the two as 
mutually dependent and not contradictory.146 Porter’s strategic 
recommendations include enhancing long-term stakeholder welfare, such as 
being concerned for consumers and local communities, in tandem with the 
development of business strategy for long-term profitability and success.147 
This model endorses the correlation between the long-term well-being of a 
company and the welfare of its stakeholders. White argues that business 
strategic thinking needs to be attuned to “long term wealth” creation, a 
concept that balances patient capital with sustainability and wider social and 
economic welfare.148  
These contemporary arguments move away from the shareholder-
centric perspective that corporations are purposed to maximize shareholder 
                                                                                                                                          
 144. Corporate social responsibility reporting is perhaps seen as one of the greater achievements 
in reflexive accountability undertaken by corporations to the wider public. See David Hess, Social 
Reporting: A Reflexive Law Approach to Corporate Social Responsiveness, 25 J. CORP. L. 41, 82 
(1999) (arguing that social reports, as reflexive law, provide enhanced information through all 
levels of a corporation, thereby allowing the corporation to understand their stakeholders and vice 
versa, and to respond appropriately). But see John M. Conley & Cynthia A. Williams, Engage, 
Embed, and Embellish: Theory Versus Practice in the Corporate Social Responsibility Movement, 
31 J. CORP. L. 1, 37–38 (2005) (empirical research suggesting that the corporate social 
responsibility movement might not be succeeding and that even if it does succeed, such success 
may not be desirable). 
 145. Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Creating Shared Value: Redefining Capitalism and 
the Role of the Corporation in Society, 89 HARV. BUS. REV. 62, 64 (2011). 
 146. Id. at 64, 66, 68, 76.  
 147. Id. at 66, 68, 72–73, 76.  
 148. ALLEN L. WHITE, BUS. FOR SOC. RESPONSIBILITY, WHAT IS LONG TERM WEALTH? 4–6, 
8–9 (2007), available at http://www.bsr.org/reports/BSR_AWhite_Long-Term-Wealth.pdf. 
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wealth and proposes to rewrite the hypothetical default bargain of all 
contractarian constituents as that of the long-term well-being and success of 
the company for all. The shared value concept would also be able to support 
a wider “contractarian” paradigm of the company, in order to incorporate 
different locations of value generation and receipt related to corporate 
activity. As argued earlier, this ideological shift in fact changes the nature 
of the contractarian paradigm to one that is not merely insular, shareholder-
centric, and private, but may accommodate a range of broader stakeholder 
interests which could be founded on social and communitarian concerns. 
Hence, against the backdrop of both such ideological movements in 
business management and the governance expectations of stewardship, 
stewardship is not likely to merely be rhetoric for institutions to report as 
they see fit. Stewardship may be a slow and evolutionary step away from 
shareholder-centered contractarianism in corporate governance. It arguably 
has the potential to change business strategic thinking in terms of long-
termism and shared value and corporate governance practice and theory in 
terms of stakeholder influence, and social and communitarian stakes. 
Nonetheless, this Article will also point out that the stewardship 
concept still suffers from some weaknesses that could undermine its 
ideological ramifications. In particular, the stewardship concept does not 
move away from giving shareholders a central governance role, and its 
ideological stance may, hence, be weak and confused. Further, the 
governance expectations of institutional shareholder stewardship may also 
be over-estimated. 
D. THE WEAKNESS OF THE STEWARDSHIP CONCEPT 
It may be argued that the stewardship concept is ideologically weak as 
it is still unclear as to whom shareholders are accountable as stewards. If the 
accountability lies with beneficiaries, then beneficiaries are possibly too 
indifferent and dispersed to hold institutions to account, and such 
accountability does not add anything above the legal trusteeship duties 
already owed. Yet, if “accountability” is something more, then the 
Stewardship Code arguably does not clearly articulate to whom institutions 
are accountable. 
One of the reasons for this perceived weakness in articulating the 
accountability channels may be that too much deference is still paid to the 
shareholder-centric corporate governance framework. Policy-makers may 
be too keen to avoid overtly introducing communitarian or stakeholder 
theory models into corporate governance, as the introduction of such 
models could cause both the theoretical and legal landscape to change 
dramatically. Hence, shareholders remain central corporate governance 
actors except that they are now required to be less atomistic, short-termist, 
selfish, and should act as “stewards.” But if we cannot pinpoint for whom 
institutions should act as stewards, then it becomes difficult to judge the 
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exercise of stewardship and institutions can then dominate the definition of 
stewardship. In other words, can the stake of the state or other stakeholders 
be adequately expressed if shareholders are in control of developing 
stewardship, engagement, and voting policies?149  
One possible development in stewardship is that stewardship can be 
seen as narrowly extending the criteria of assessment that institutions use in 
evaluating their asset managers. Commentators have written extensively on 
how asset managers are evaluated for short-term financial performance by 
institutions,150 and although long-termism and the wider good are attributes 
in the Stewardship Code that could pose challenges in reworking the 
evaluation matrix,151 institutions could still develop narrowly-extended 
evaluation matrices and confine the exercise of stewardship to a form of 
monitoring over asset managers. Further, evaluation matrices for long-
termism and the wider good could also become proceduralized and 
subjective; that is, that institutions may look for the existence of corporate 
policies dealing with social responsibility and stakeholder engagement 
instead of critically considering the corporation’s substantive business 
vision and strategy. Narrow-minded constructions of stewardship, 
constructed in policies that institutions are responsible for developing, 
could undermine the wider ideological developments toward stakeholder 
accountability and “shared value.” Institutions may be tempted toward a 
narrow-minded construction in order to simplify their “comply or explain” 
obligation. 
It may also be argued that the stewardship concept is doomed to be 
ideologically weak as it is ideologically confused. It is an unhappy 
patchwork: seeking to infuse some stakeholder and communitarian 
concerns into the dominant shareholder-centered contractarian framework, 
but unwilling to be bold enough to embark on the progressive changes. Just 
because shareholders have the capacity and proximity to monitor 
corporations does not mean that they should or would take up the 
expression of other stakes that stakeholders have. The investment role of 
institutions defines their objectives in monitoring. If we pass other interests 
and stakes onto institutions and expect such institutions to be able to 
internally mediate that which we have passed on, can we realistically expect 
them to arrive at a proportionate and balanced “stewardship” stance with 
ease? And are we, by “passing the buck” to institutions, actually avoiding 
the more difficult task of ideologically reconciling private interests, such as 
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428 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 6 
business and investment, with the more social and communitarian 
expectations of corporate citizenship? 
E. FAILING TO CHALLENGE THE AGENCY PARADIGM 
A number of commentators have argued that the conventional agency 
paradigm that defines shareholders as residual claimants and principals, and 
management as agents, is too simplistic when applied to the banking and 
finance sector.152 Ciancanelli et al. argue that the agency paradigm is much 
more complex in the banking sector.153 As banks are highly leveraged— 
depending on deposits and wholesale funding to form a large part of their 
working capital—depositors and creditors share a substantial amount of 
residual risk. Further, the potential of state bailout, as mentioned above, 
puts the state into the position of a key stakeholder mitigating shareholder 
and creditor risk. Hence, the agency paradigm in the banking sector is not a 
simple binary shareholder-management model, but should comprise of key 
stakeholders such as the state, depositors, and wholesale and repo market 
creditors. 
The Stewardship Code, by putting shareholders into the central 
monitoring role, may be endorsing the simple agency paradigm in corporate 
governance, which may arguably be retrograde in considering corporate 
governance reform in the banking sector. It may be argued that by shackling 
stewardship to a shareholder-centered premise, an opportunity has been 
missed to distinguish corporate governance in banks from other industries. 
If we distinguish corporate governance in banks from other industries to 
begin with, this may open the way for new dialogic movements to take 
place in respect of the corporate governance of banks and financial 
institutions, and a broader range of stakeholders could be enrolled into the 
governance landscape monitoring banking trends and impact.  
It could be argued that the Stewardship Code mistakenly concentrates 
monitoring in the hands of shareholders, where other stakeholders may have 
greater incentive to monitor, thereby unnecessarily relegating the 
importance of other stakeholders. Yet, depositor apathy is well 
documented,154 and the state is able to monitor through micro- and macro-
prudential regulatory supervision. So, can it be said that because other 
stakeholders do not amount to much anyway, re-emphasizing shareholders’ 
role is the appropriate step to take in corporate governance? This Article is 
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inclined toward the view that the emphasis placed on shareholders in the 
Stewardship Code reflects a reluctance to take a more progressive position 
in corporate governance. This is a curious stance given that policy-makers 
view corporate governance as an important driver in the general governance 
landscape for the financial sector. As the crisis provides an apt opportunity 
for reform, it is curious why there is such reluctance to introduce bolder 
shifts in the corporate governance paradigm in the banking sector. Bruner 
also argues that the re-emphasis placed on shareholders in the Stewardship 
Code is path-dependent rather than imaginative.155 
F. OVER-ESTIMATING THE GOVERNANCE POTENTIAL OF 
INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDERS 
Further, it may be argued that the governance potential of institutional 
shareholders may be over-estimated in “stewardship.” It can be said that 
sufficiently important issues would not likely be left to shareholder 
governance anyway. In other words, if an issue becomes an important one 
of social concern, reliance would not be placed on institutions as stewards 
to mediate the various stakes it is asked to represent, or to decide on a 
course of engagement to change corporate behavior. The state would 
directly regulate or intervene. Stewardship is not, therefore, intended to be a 
channel for strong policy or regulatory representation. Rather, this is the 
case of bankers’ remuneration regulation. 
Executive remuneration, and now bankers’ remuneration, has often 
been subject to academic discussion as to what extent remuneration 
arrangements are actually efficient and reflect optimal market prices, given 
supply and demand conditions and the worth of the executive’s 
performance.156 Nevertheless, regulators have not hitherto taken intrusive 
approaches even if market failure is suspected. In the U.K., much reliance is 
placed on independent remuneration committees to make the decisions for 
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their respective companies and on shareholders’ scrutiny of the disclosure 
made. Post-global financial crisis, features of bank/financial institution 
remuneration that give massive bonuses and take a short-termist view of 
performance are argued to have contributed to weak risk management157 in 
financial firms. Where the same flaw appears in many financial institutions, 
systemic risk effects will result.158 The connection between remuneration 
policies and risk management is now recognized and legalized in the EU 
Directive of November 2010 amending the Capital Requirements Directives 
2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC.159 The Financial Services Authority (FSA) 
has enacted the Remuneration Code in the FSA Handbook SYSC 19A in 
order to transpose the Directive. The overriding principle in remuneration 
control is that remuneration should be aligned with sound risk management; 
hence, risk management input is mandatory in the design of remuneration 
packages.160 The regulatory intervention into remuneration at financial 
institutions is not imposed due to market failure, but is rather framed around 
the rhetoric of systemic risk and public interest. As external considerations 
of systemic risk and social cost cannot, by their nature, be satisfactorily 
undertaken at the level of private/internal governance by remuneration 
committees,161 the way is paved for regulatory intervention to provide 
governance. Hence, policy-makers would not likely address issues of 
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regulatory concern through a relatively indirect and weak mechanism such 
as shareholder stewardship. 
Shareholder stewardship is a reflexive expression of the indirect stakes 
of “key stakeholders”; however, such “stakes” do not amount to that which 
may warrant immediate regulatory attention and control. Even if the state is 
a “key stakeholder” in a particular sector, it is likely that “key 
stakeholders,” such as the state, would only bring pressure to bear on 
institutions in challenging times rather than in good times. In good times, 
stewardship could likely become cosmetic, as many would be indifferent as 
to how and why institutions engage their investee corporations, and the 
state may not wish to preemptively influence shareholder governance where 
there are no fires to fight. More demands on institutions to express social 
stakes may only be made in more difficult times. But if an issue attains 
enough social importance, regulatory control may, nevertheless, be 
imposed. Therefore, the likely trajectory of the institution’s governance role 
could be an ebbing of governance in good times and total irrelevance in 
times of crises when regulatory control takes over. This could leave the 
governance role of stewardship practically meaningless. Hence, shareholder 
stewardship could ultimately become a lightweight and a mere rhetoric, not 
actually expressing the indirect stakes and social concerns as a consistent 
force for governance. 
Despite the abovementioned weaknesses, this Article sees potential in 
the ideologically transforming possibilities in stewardship: as a crank in a 
window through which stakeholder interests and communitarian values 
could be let in. It remains to be seen whether regulators would actively 
influence the governance role of institutions and whether stakeholders 
would actively seize opportunities to influence the discourse and trajectory 
in corporate governance. This Article hopes that by framing stewardship in 
terms of a form of indirect representation of “key stakeholders’” stakes, the 
evolutionary potential in transforming corporate governance can be seized. 
It is now appropriate to seek a balanced reconciliation between the private 
contractarian and capital-centered view of the corporation, and its actual 
social and public significance. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article argues that the Stewardship Code, introduced in response 
to the global financial crisis 2008–2009, may be regarded as having 
introduced an ideological shift in corporate governance theory in the U.K. 
Although the Stewardship Code affirms the key governance role of 
shareholders, institutional shareholders are especially asked to behave as 
“stewards,” and thus, to focus on long-termism and take into account the 
wider public interest and social good. This Article also argues that while the 
Stewardship Code cannot be regarded as supporting the shareholder-
centered contractarian model of corporate governance, which is dominant in 
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both theory and law in the U.K., as the implications of the private nature of 
shareholder-centered corporate governance are not fully supported by the 
Stewardship Code, this does not mean that the Stewardship Code embraces 
communitarian theories of corporate governance as an archetypal opposite. 
This Article further argues that the Stewardship Code, read together with 
the Walker Review—which provides a contextual backdrop to the 
Stewardship Code—has affirmed the “governance” capacity of institutional 
shareholders as a form of “market-based” governance that is capable of 
monitoring systemically significant financial institutions. Such monitoring 
is not only undertaken to further institutions’ private investment interests, 
but also to represent the interests of stakeholders, such as the state, who 
may incur the liability of financial bailout. For this reason, stewardship is 
an expression of representing “key stakeholder” interests, such as the 
state’s, which mitigate shareholders’ own residual risk in firms. This Article 
therefore argues that the representative capacity of stewardship, governed 
by normative standards for engagement in the Stewardship Code—such as 
long-termism and consideration for wider good—has the potential to 
introduce changes to the dominant shareholder-centered corporate 
governance theory and frameworks. 
This Article suggests that stewardship brings about an evolutionary step 
toward mitigating the central role of shareholders in corporate governance, 
and although it does not go as far as to endorse stakeholder theory, the 
expression of stakeholder interests through stewardship can still be 
powerful depending on how stewardship is called to account. There are, 
however, ideological and practical challenges to transforming the dominant 
shareholder-centered contractarian framework in corporate governance 
theory. This Article, having hopefully provided a balanced evaluation, 
remains optimistic about the evolutionary possibilities of stewardship as a 
first step toward ideological change and development. 
